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This study explores the construction of the Indonesian Presidential 
candidates’ image during the 2014 presidential election from the perspective of 
Facebook users. I analyzed Facebook users’ comments derived from one of the 
candidate’s Facebook pages, Prabowo Subianto, by employing a thematic 
analysis to examine an official posting’s comments on June 19, 2014 where a 
group of celebrities supported Prabawo Subianto. Comments were extracted 
from June 20, 2014 to July 8, 2014, which was 20 days before election day. 
Results indicated that the construction of a candidate’s image involved the 
relationship between the perceived attributes of the candidate and national 
identity; the relationship between the candidate and his supporters; the perceived 
personality traits of the candidate, and the ability of supporters to identify with the 
candidates on a personal level. Moreover, there were also inferences related to 
political scandals, their treatment by other politicians, spiritual values, and the 
future state of the country.  The study also showed how users tried to make 
sense of their political world by simplifying the complexity of a candidate through 
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In the context of online political discourse, social media have the potential 
to facilitate a variety of forms of political activity among people. The increased 
utilization of social media platforms involving online social networking sites 
(SNS), such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, has provided ample 
opportunity for politicians to create a dialog with prospective constituents, 
propose their upcoming programs, promote their electability, and orchestrate 
fame for themselves for the purpose of raising greater political capital (Vitak, 
Zube, Smock, Carr, Ellison, & Lampe, 2011; Wheeler, 2013). Along with that, 
SNSs allow users to generate political content, participate in political discussions, 
converse about politics with other individuals, and acquire information about the 
candidates (Stieglitz, Brockmann, & Dang-Xuan, 2012; Vitak et. al., 2011).  
The efficacy of SNS for political purposes, especially Facebook, was 
clearly seen during the 2008 U.S. presidential election. Facebook successfully 
facilitated Barrack Obama’s presidential campaign, especially in reaching local 
constituents who were politically unengaged (Smuts, 2010). Although some 
scholars have argued that Obama’s win was not due to Facebook interactions, 
his campaign strategy, which clearly involved social media in an unprecedented 
way, showed that Facebook and other social media platforms can coexist with 
the structured traditional media to assist Democratic politics at grassroots levels 
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(Johnson & Perlmutter, 2010; Wen, 2014). More recently, the relevance of 
Facebook was evident in the 2014 presidential election in Indonesia, in which 
candidates incorporated Facebook to heighten public participation in the 
campaign process (Anggraini, Mustofa, & Sadewo, 2014). Arguably, using SNSs 
is particularly important during an election campaign because it enables 
politicians to establish a political arena that can affect the results of elections 
(Stieglitz, Brockmann, & Dang-Xuan, 2012).  
To date, Facebook has reached more than one billion daily active users 
internationally and is placed as the most popular SNS in the U.S. (Facebook 
Newsroom, 2016; Pew Research Center, 2016). In Indonesia, Facebook is the 
most visited site nationally according to a Web-based marketing company, 
Emarketer (2016). Additionally, among countries with the most Facebook users 
in the 19-34 age category, Indonesia is in fourth position, just below India 
(Emarketer, 2016).  
With such a tremendous number of users, Facebook has gained 
considerable attention from political scholars. Existing political communication 
literature has focused, for example, on the effect of Facebook on political 
participation and its effectiveness among college students (Kushin & Yamamoto, 
2010; Vitak et. al., 2011), the benefits of political Facebook groups (Wooley, 
Limperos, & Oliver, 2010), the motives of voters using Facebook groups during 
the 2008 presidential election (Fernandes, Giurcane, Bowers, & Neeely, 2010), 
or the relationship between Facebook and political cynicism during election 
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(Hanson, Haridakis, Wagstaff, Rekha, & Ponder, 2010). Studies on the use of 
Facebook during international elections include the use of Facebook among 
German politicians (Stieglitz, Brockmann, & Dang-Xuan, 2012), the discourse of 
Taiwanese political actors (Wen, 2014), the influence of Facebook during the 
2014 presidential election in Indonesia (Anggraini, Mustofa, & Sadewo, 2014), 
the use of Facebook by the political parties in Macedonia (Emruli, Zejneli, & Agai, 
2011), and the political branding of Facebook by female Romanian politicians 
(Savulescu & Vitelar, 2012). In addition, scholars have also studied how social 
media, like Facebook, affected voter perceptions of images of political candidates 
(Dimitrova & Bystrom, 2013).   
Although previous studies have examined the role of Facebook in politics 
in cultural contexts outside the U.S., there is little research on the use of 
Facebook in Indonesian politics. The purpose of my research is to explore how 
Indonesians used Facebook during the 2014 presidential election to draw 
conclusions about the role of social media in constructing political images of the 
presidential candidates. This research is specifically concerned with the 
interpretations coming from the discourse of Facebook users. The 2014 
presidential election is particularly interesting because the polarization effect 
between the candidates remarkably energized ordinary citizens to engage in 
political discussions through Facebook. There also seemed to be a growing 
trend, in regards to political strategies, where political actors were more focused 
on building strategic public images of themselves rather than emphasizing their 
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political parties. In fact, previous analyses of the 2009 presidential election 
revealed that candidates employed various strategic maneuvers involving 
traditional media as a way to promote their public images (Prasetyawan, 2012). 
Although previous studies have explained the way political actors constructed 
their public images, research on the capacity of citizens to make sense of these 
candidate images needs more attention. Studying images of presidential 
candidates formulated by social media users is important because it offers 
insights about the degree of political knowledge found in citizens and helps to 
better understand how they translate the current political situation in Indonesia.    
Hence, I propose the following research question: How do Indonesian 
voters construct the images of presidential candidates on Facebook?  
The present study involves a thematic analysis of users’ comments on one 
of the presidential candidates’ official Facebook page, Prabowo Subianto, over a 
period of 20 days prior to the presidential election. By analyzing a sample of 
users’ comments, I seek to understand how public opinion develops around 
certain discourse themes that rationalize the inferences voters employed to 
describe images of the candidates. The analysis of users’ comments 
distinguishes the study from other scholarly research which has focused on how 
Facebook generates social activism (Lim, 2013; Gazali, 2014; Molaei, 2015), the 
level of civility of political discussion on Facebook (Molaei, 2014), and the quality 
of political discussion on Facebook during the 2009 Indonesian presidential 
election (Molaei, 2014). 
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It is crucial to study Indonesia because of its unique position as the world’s 
third largest democracy, which in turn makes it interesting as a “living laboratory” 
for social media studies (Gazali, 2014, p. 426). In this context, it is important to 
see the dynamics of online political conversations among Indonesian users, 
particularly since the candidates were considered populist elites, an aspect 
missing in previous elections. By assessing how Indonesian Facebook users 
interact in a political context, this study contributes to advancing the knowledge 
concerning Facebook’s capability to facilitate political discourse in a country 
where “the democracy is still in its infancy, unlike the U.S” (Ananta, Arifin, & 





HOW VOTERS CONSTRUCT IMAGES OF CANDIDATES 
 
This chapter focuses on several concepts necessary for understanding 
how voters construct the images of political candidates as part of public opinion 
formation. In the following, I review the notion of public opinion, the role of 
candidate image in the formation of public opinion, and the role of social media in 
the process. This review will offer an understanding of the factors that contribute 
to voters’ perceptions when interpreting their political world.  
Public Opinion 
Public opinion has been conceptualized differently by various social 
science scholars, and how it was defined depended on “how it is communicated” 
(Larson, 1999, p. 133). For example, public opinion can be looked at as opinion 
distribution, which is an outcome of poll results (Blumer, 1948), but also as an 
outcome of sociological process (Peters, 1995).  
The construct of public opinion in the political setting has its roots in Greek 
culture (Peters, 1995), but in Western culture, public opinion as a concept only 
started to emerge in the late 18th century (Habermas, 1989). Since the first 
emergence of opinion in the political realm, intellectuals have differentiated 
opinion from knowledge, and considered the notion of opinion separated from the 
notion of truth (Peters, 1995). One of the classical philosophers, Plato, proposed 
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that doxa (or opinion) was “a popular belief,” transient and free from philosophical 
rigors (Peters, 1995, p. 4).  
Aristotle, perceived opinion as “a part of human activity since all human 
action is historical, practical, and contingent” (Peters, 1995, p. 4). Aristotle further 
asserted that to act wisely, “humans need wisdom that comes from accumulated 
experience of human affairs” (Peters, 1995, p. 4). The Greek philosophers also 
saw opinion as the outcome of a decision process derived from “aggregate 
views” (Peters, 1995, p. 5). Similarly, 17th century thinkers conceptualized 
opinion as a source of “prejudice, probability, and authority, which makes it a 
contradiction to the components of episteme (knowledge)” (Peters, 1995, p. 4). 
Opinion was perceived as a decision that lacked certainty; something similar to 
Plato’s perspective (Peters, 1995). In respect to public affairs, opinion rested on 
state power or “the consent of the governed” and represented people’s support 
for government authority (Peters, 1995, p. 5). 
It is interesting to note that the notion of “public” has contributed 
dramatically to transforming opinion, and, like “opinion,” “public” has been 
conceptualized differently since the period of the Greeks and Romans (Peters, 
1995, p. 6). According to Taylor (1990), the notion of public can be referred to 
“what matters to the whole society, or belongs to this whole society, or pertains to 
the instruments, or institution or loci by which the society comes together as a 
body and acts” (p. 108). In other words, “public occurs in the loci of public space 
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and becomes a sociological aggregate” (Massam & Dickinson, 2011; Peters, 
1995, p. 7).  
Initially, “public” was recognized abstractly by people and it was “privately 
restricted by race, class, and gender” (Carey, 1995, p. 380). However, since the 
public spaces were filled with workers and merchants from different social 
classes, “public” became something that carried “specific social information 
involving a group of strangers who gathered in public houses and discussed 
political issues” (Carey, 1995, p. 380).  Strangers in this context referred to those 
congregating in public places to debate the news. In other words, these publics 
were formed in an open context (Carey, 1995).  
History shows that for a public to be formed, it needs an outlet where 
strangers can have a proper conversation and regular contact with one another, 
as well as issues to talk about, as circulated through newspapers and pamphlets 
(Carey, 1995). Mass media, therefore, allowed the construction of the 
conversationalist (Carey, 1995). Another aspect that is important for public 
formation is the existence of public places where “strangers could gather and 
share opinions” (Carey, 1995, p. 381). Therefore, a public is more than just a 
group of strangers, but rather a political power that goes “beyond the State and 
its representatives” (Carey, 1995, p. 382). A public, according to Papacharissi 
(2002), “suggests ideas of citizenship, commonality, and things not private, but 
accessible and observable by all” (p. 10). This conception of the public marks the 
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shift from considering power as the prerogative of the State to recognizing power 
in the public and public discourse. 
Habermas (1989) argued that the public sphere was “a place for social 
interaction outside the private sphere (the home) and the sphere of public 
authority (the state/court) whereby people meet in a space that promotes 
sociability, equality, and communication to form public opinion” (Calhoun, 2012, 
p.75). It is due to the “broader political and social arena” within the public sphere 
that the meaning of public opinion shifted throughout different eras (Glynn, 
Herbst, Lindeman, O’Keefe, & Shapiro, 2016, p. 27; Habermas, 1989). 
Essentially, the meaning of public opinion and how people express it are always 
shifting since public life itself is constantly changing (Habermas, 1989). The 
emergence of the public sphere was facilitated by a distinct characteristic of the 
18th century European bourgeoisie society operating in the realm of London 
coffeehouses, Parisian salons, and German table societies (Calhoun, 2012). In 
these coffeehouses and salons, groups of people gathered together freely to 
engage in an open rational debate free from social ranks and political strata 
(Habermas, 1989; Huda, 2010), without regard to economic and political interests 
(Graham, 2015). Essentially, in the formation of public opinion, the continuous 
development of rational discourse was supported by the active reasoning 
constructed by the public (Dahlberg, 2004; Graham, 2015). Habermas (1989) 
also points out the main difference between the realm of coffeehouse and salon 
life by highlighting women’s participation in the salon’s construction, a role not 
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performed in coffeehouses (Calhoun, 2012). Unlike salons, coffeehouses feature 
a space open to any individual with enough money to purchase coffee. In salons, 
by contrast, the guests depended on the selection made by the salon hostesses 
who had “the power to allow and deny guest entry” (Calhoun, 2012, p. 75). In 
summary, the formation of the public opinion as we understand the concept 
today, was crucially dependent on the emergence of a public sphere. 
Mass media played an important role in the formation of public opinion. 
According to Bryce (1888), “public opinion formation happens through four 
different organs: the press, public meetings (especially those that occur during 
the political campaign), elections, and citizen associations” (as cited in 
Strömbäck, 2013, p. 17). As suggested by Anstead and O'Loughlin (2015), in a 
contemporary setting, social media may be considered a new venue where 
opinion becomes manifest, as it enables voluntary public meetings and citizens’ 
associations (Anstead & O'Loughlin, 2015). More recently, Foshay (2016) 
remarks that an important aspect of the public sphere is that it goes beyond the 
free flow of information collected in the public space to include active 
participation and the construction of social activity that involves “collective public 
will” (p. 233). Thus, the Internet may be considered an online forum akin to a 
public space for the expression of deliberative politics (Papacharissi, 2002). 
However, as a public sphere, the Internet may act as a political instrument able 
to facilitate discussion that allows exchange of ideas and positions. In other 
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words, virtual space “enhances discussion; a virtual sphere enhances 
democracy” (Papacharissi, 2002, p. 11).  
The Role of Social Media in Public Opinion Formation 
The expansion of social media sites has changed both how public opinion 
research is carried out and how researchers access user information about their 
emotions, thoughts, and behavior (Murphy, Link, Childs, Tesfaye, Dean, Stern, 
Pasek, Cohen, Callegaro, & Hardwood, 2014). Furthermore, as mentioned by 
Murphy et al., (2014), the proliferation of social media platforms and the number 
of opinions expressed on SNSs may become an alternative set of data for 
scholars. In the following, I offer a brief review of recent scholarly research 
concerning the role of social media in public opinion studies.  
Social media have become a valuable source to analyze opinion 
interaction and formation since they provide a tool for people to participate in the 
production, consumption and distribution of information (Lim, 2013; Xiong & Liu, 
2014). Through social media, users are forming their opinions based on the 
“synthesis and contrast of viewpoints”, of their networked friends (Gionis, Terzi, & 
Tsaparas, 2013, p. 1). It is important to note that opinion formation derived from 
social media is different from that based on traditional media and is also more 
complex when compared to real word interaction (Xiong & Liu, 2014). This is 
because social media allow information diffusion to happen faster and discussion 
can be done anonymously (Xiong & Liu, 2014). 
12 
 
Given their rapid expansion, social media platforms continue to receive 
attention from many scholars, including those who are interested in the process 
of public opinion formation on Facebook and Twitter. A study by Xiong and Liu 
(2014), for example, was dedicated to investigating opinion formation on Twitter. 
Using more than one million Twitter posts, these authors assessed users’ 
sentiments. The results showed that public opinion has the tendency to develop 
in an ordered state in which only a limited number of opinions (in this case, one 
point of view only) dominates the conversation. Furthermore, the data also 
demonstrated that users are more likely to express an opinion and maintain it 
rather than make an alteration. Interestingly, users’ actions were consistent with 
their opinions and had the potential to influence other users.  
 Another scholar examined the way social media were involved in the 
opinion formation of Islamic movements in Egypt (El Gazzar, 2013). Using users’ 
comments on Facebook and Twitter, the study postulated that opinions and 
comments from social media would reflect specific frames of expressions that 
can be used to predict public opinion surrounding the society. The findings 
suggested that the negativity expressed towards Islam in social media parallels 
the higher frequencies of anti-Islamists in actual events. In other words, the 
negative public opinions are based on the current situation. One important 
implication from this study is that social media can be used as a tool to judge the 
public since it reflects opinions of civilians rather than as a medium that caused 
the Arab Spring.   
13 
 
 Research also showed that social media could be used to understand 
public opinion surrounding the 2010 general election in the U.K. (Anstead & 
O’Laughlin, 2015). Using Twitter comments, the results demonstrated that 
opinion formation on Twitter reflected public opinion formulated by political 
journalists in offline traditional media settings. Lee, Choi, Kim, and Kim (2014) 
conducted a similar study focusing on political discussions with specific attention 
given to social media and their relationship with opinion polarization. Results 
indicated that individuals who use Facebook and Twitter are more likely to have 
polarized opinions. However, it is important to note that this polarization is 
experienced by individuals who already hold strong opinions and have greater 
awareness of public affairs. One important finding from this study was that social 
media, in the context of public opinion, are largely dependent on the individual 
characteristics of users and the structure of the social media itself.    
 Another study demonstrated that Twitter has the potential to be a 
monitoring tool of public opinion for political actors during the election period 
(Frame & Brachotte, 2015). More specifically, Twitter allows users to capture 
predominant public sentiment surrounding certain issues that occurred in the 
online realm using a real-time monitoring system. French politicians have used 
public media to sense what they call “the temperature” of public opinion, which 
then give them insights into which relevant resources should be transferred for 
their constituents (Frame & Brachotte, 2015, p. 280). Ultimately, politicians are 
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strategically showing their constituents that they are becoming part of an on-
going political discourse. 
 Connecting with the results above regarding opinion polarization, it is 
important to note that social media can potentially created what Sunstein (2001) 
referred to as group polarization. With this concept, “like-minded individuals with 
similar opinions are engaged in discussion to fortify their pre-existing views, and 
to move toward more extreme points of view in the general direction in which 
they were already tending” (Sunstein, 2001, p. 5).  This condition is popular 
known as the “echo-chambers” (Sunstein). Sunstein (2001) further explained that 
when individuals are primarily interacted with other individuals who belong to the 
same political party, “there is a potential for the development of different forms of 
extremism, and for profound mutual misunderstanding within individuals outside 
the group” (p. 5). The “fragmentation of public sphere or echo-chambers can be 
strengthened by the nature of social media that allow people to find others who 
have similar opinions or positions like them” (Batorski & Grzywinska, 2017, p. 4). 
In addition, the notion of a sharp group polarization is strongly apparent in the 
2014 presidential contest between Prabowo and Jokowi, especially within each 
supporter who takes part in the virtual sphere of Facebook.        
The Role of Facebook in Election 
 Though Facebook was initially intended to create and maintain 
interpersonal ties within its online community members (Woolley, Limperos & 
Oliver, 2010), the transformative use of Facebook during the 2008 presidential 
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election in the U.S. illustrates the growing potential of social media as an outlet of 
political participation for candidates and users (Vitak et. al., 2011). For the first 
time, Facebook partnered with a traditional media company, ABC News, to 
combine news feeds and online political activity (“ABC News”, 2007) into an 
application that enabled both the streaming of a presidential debate and user 
dialogue before, during, and after that debate (“ABC News”, 2007; Carlise & 
Patton, 2013). In other words, the application worked as an extension of the 
actual debate, which aired in one-hour sessions (“ABC News Joins”, 2007). The 
application also allowed users to follow ABC reporters who continually updated 
news stories and documented the situation on the ground throughout the 
campaign process (“ABC News Joins”, 2007). Considering such an extensive 
collaboration, Facebook played a prominent role in facilitating a new form of 
political communication during the 2008 U.S. presidential campaign (Carlise & 
Patton, 2013).    
 During political elections, social media have the capacity to affect the 
decision-making process of potential voters, which in turn, may benefit certain 
political interests (Metaxas & Mustafaraj, 2012). In practice, social media 
analysts have also reported that social media platforms enable the manipulation 
of the number of followers claimed by candidates (Metaxas & Mustafaraj, 2012). 
These authors, for example, noted that in the 2012 U.S. presidential election, the 
candidates received more than 110,000 followers in only one day, however, 
Peterman’s analysis (2012, as cited in Metaxas & Mustafaraj, 2012) 
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demonstrated that not all followers were real individuals, i.e. some were fake 
derived from a service of buying followers. The alteration of the number of 
followers is something that the general public does not usually notice.  
 The utilization of social media in electoral campaigns has been examined 
by political communication scholars in different political contexts outside the U.S. 
with mixed results. Despite cultural differences, Facebook has turned out to be 
more of a way of circumventing traditional media to disseminate political 
information than a platform encouraging genuine political discussion, or even a 
“cause” of more political engagement, such as voting or meaningful political 
activism in real life. Of particular interest are the studies that examine the role of 
Facebook interactions in altering the outcomes of elections. Gomez (2014), for 
example, reported that social media, such as Facebook and Twitter, mobilized a 
higher percentage of voters during Malaysia’s 2013 general election (GE13)—in 
fact, the highest political turnout in Malaysian politics to that point. When it comes 
to electoral results, however, social media “remains elusive” and is not the only 
factor influencing the results of the election (Gomez, 2014, p. 102). From the 
GE13 election, it was noted that social media have a capacity for “mobilizing and 
politicizing the citizenry” but do not significantly affect the actual results per se 
(Gomez, 2014, p. 101).  
Kimseng (2014) analyzed the role of social media in assisting the political 
change in Cambodia’s 2013 election. Results demonstrated that social media 
helped the opposition party to obtain a better electoral gain. Moreover, Facebook 
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represented an effective platform for the opposition party to voice its agenda to 
its constituents, a phenomenon which did not exist in the preceding elections 
(Kimseng, 2014). Social media are progressively surpassing the traditional mass 
media as platforms for political discussion and are breaking the monopoly on 
information dissemination by traditional mass media; this is especially true in the 
Cambodian context. Comparably, social media also played an important role 
during Kenya’s general election where it fostered mobilization among voters and 
allowed citizens to debate political issues (Bing, 2015). Additionally, people paid 
a great deal of attention to the presidential candidates because of their Facebook 
activities (Bing, 2015). One important finding in the context of Kenya’s elections 
is that when it comes to political change, the efficacy of social media, including 
Facebook, is far from a certainty because active online participation does not 
automatically translate into politically meaningful behaviors (Bing, 2015; Ibahrine, 
2008). Instead, the key variables that impact politics, according to Lim (2012), 
are the “societal contexts and arrangements around the technology” (p. 638).  
Scholars have also monitored the use of Facebook by political parties and 
leaders during the 2012 election in Georgia (Kakachia, Pataraia, & Cecire, 2014). 
Results showed that Facebook was chosen as the preferred communication tool 
by the Georgian political parties. However, instead of using Facebook as the 
place to introduce political programs or policies, Facebook was mostly used to 
promote the personalities of the political leaders. One pivotal role of Facebook in 
the Georgian political context was to disseminate information in ways that 
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circumvented the traditional mass media typically controlled by the government. 
Through Facebook, political parties could reach out to the wider public and bring 
out news more freely than possible through traditional media. Interestingly, 
Georgian political parties have never utilized Facebook as a tool for “opinion 
polls” (Kakachia, Pataraia, & Cecire, 2014). In fact, Georgian political parties 
often delete negative comments or feedback, which suggests that “official” 
Facebook profiles are more tools for public image construction rather than 
genuine platforms for political discussion. Scholars also noted the role of social 
media in reflecting the political behavior of people during the 2012 general 
election in South Korea (Nam, Lee, & Park, 2014). Using a quantitative research 
method, these authors found that voters voluntarily disseminated information 
across different social media platforms, including Facebook, particularly since 
Facebook was considered more private than Twitter in terms of building 
connections. Facebook was also found to be less biased than Twitter in 
demonstrating the actual political landscapes during the election.  
Besides distributing political information and creating a platform for users 
to engage among themselves and with the candidate, research is unclear 
whether Facebook activity actually leads to substantive political outcomes (e.g. 
increase in voting). Pennington, Winfrey, Warner, and Kearney (2015) studied 
the political engagement of Facebook users during the 2012 general election in 
the U.S. The results of the study showed that simply following the candidate’s 
Facebook page does not necessarily increase voters’ political engagement such 
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as voting turnout or the efficacy of the election itself. Earlier research by Kushin 
and Yamamoto (2010) also showed similar findings in which participants’ 
attention to social media feeds did not correlate with political self-efficacy, 
although social media users did become more cognitively active in the political 
discourse provided by the social media at the time of the 2008 election. One 
explanation for the non-significant results is that many may consider political 
information derived from online interaction to be less credible than information 
from offline interaction (Kushin & Yamamoto, 2010). Baumgartner & Morris 
(2010) suggested that social media do not increase participants’ political 
engagement with the election itself, and that the political participation of many 
users seems to be confined strictly to online activity.  
Other studies found that the use of social media influences political 
participation during election. For example, Baek (2015) showed that political 
social media use contributes to electoral mobilization. However, the outcome 
depends on the quantity of political information users obtain from their circle of 
friends. Through their networks, users are exposed to various political messages 
and get persuaded at the same time, which makes users more likely to vote. 
Furthermore, an earlier study by Alujevic (2012) indicated that higher 
involvement with Facebook leads to greater political participation in offline 
settings. This study suggested that online campaigns should formulate effective 
social media strategies since social media activity might translate into political 
participation. Similar findings by Vitak, Zube, Smcok, Carr, Ellison, and Lampe 
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(2011) showed that political activity on Facebook can predict political activity in 
real life, possibly because the architecture of the platform naturally allows fast 
information movement through the feeds section, which in turn encourages users 
to participate. 
Candidates Images and Elections 
 In a famous early twentieth century work, Lippmann (1922) explained the 
role of the public’s social construction of political issues for the functioning of 
democracies:  
…the real environment is altogether too big, too complex, and too fleeting 
for direct acquaintance. We are not equipped to deal with so much 
subtlety, so much variety, so many permutations and combinations. And 
although we have to act in that environment, we have to reconstruct it on a 
simpler model before we can manage it.” The public’s attempt to socially 
construct a simplified candidate image during elections is part of the same 
process. Before discussing how the process works, it is important to briefly 
review several definitions of political image in general. (p. 20) 
One of the scholars who initiated a discussion of political image is 
Kenneth Boulding (Hacker, 1995). As an economist scholar, Boulding described 
image as general structures that individuals use to make sense of human 
behavior, which involve all stimuli that occur either internally or externally 
throughout individual lives (Hacker, 2004). Therefore, the basic element of image 
is not about the product of one stimulus, but is all the information owned by the 
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individual to judge others, and is a subjective experience (Hacker, 2004). Other 
scholars, Nimmo and Savage, defined political image as a complex structure that 
is related to political messages which influence one another (1976, as cited in 
Hacker, 2004). Thus, there is an element of transaction between image and 
political messages. Hacker (2004) further explains that, according to Nimmo and 
Savage, the formation of candidates’ political image is not only determined by 
their political messages, but also affected by the current impressions voters have 
of candidates. There is no consensus among scholars regarding the definition of 
political image; however, as noted by Hacker (2004), the general essence of a 
candidate’s image refers to “clusters of voter perceptions of candidates” (p. 4).   
Politicians’ images are essentially important for the success of their 
campaigns, and this is especially evident in the context of modern political 
campaigns in the U.S. (Kjeldahl, Carmichael, & Mertz, 1971; Hacker, 1995; 
Hacker, 2004; Balmas & Sheafer, 2010). This may be because political actors 
can establish or mold their images through utilization of traditional media 
involving television political advertisements, newspapers, magazines, and radio 
(Kjeldahl, Carmichael, & Mertz, 1971). For example, in the Indonesian political 
context, many of the presidential candidates in the 2004 presidential election 
spent more time on televised advertisements to cultivate particular public images, 
rather than talking about their political programs (Prasetywan, 2012). As argued 
by scholars, a candidate’s image is influenced by their campaigners’ skills in 
using media (Nimmo & Savage, 1976). Furthermore, throughout the campaign 
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trails, “politicians often times employ several positive characteristics, such as 
traits of honesty, integrity, and experience, in order to attract more attention from 
the voters since those traits are positively perceived by constituents” (Kjeldahl, 
Carmichael, & Mertz, 1971, p. 129). As explained by Fridkin and Kenney (2011), 
“politicians focus on traits assessment in their campaign messages because 
people are comfortable in making trait evaluation; in fact, people involve in trait 
measurements throughout their daily activities” (p. 62). Additionally, voters are 
more likely to form affective impressions of candidates before they use a more 
complicated cognition process when evaluating images of political candidates 
(Hacker, 2004). These affective impressions can also be affected by people’s 
evaluation of candidate’s qualifications (Kiousis, Bantimaroudis, & Ban, 1999). 
In addition to the availability of information concerning candidates’ 
characteristics, important events or “context of the campaign” such as 
presidential debates, for example, can also offer an opportunity for voters to 
evaluate images of candidates (Mckiney & Stephenson, 2002; Warner, Carlin, 
Winfrey, Schnoebelen, & Trosanovski, 2011; Zakahi, 2004). A comparison study 
of the candidates’ image before and after debates revealed that debates affected 
voters’ perceptions of a candidate’s performance and qualities, such as 
leadership and qualifications (Winfrey, Schnoebelen, & Trosanovski, 2011). More 
importantly, voters’ measurements of image (measured using item scores) 
improved after the debate. It is important to note that the higher image scores are 
affected by the prior knowledge and impressions that people have of the 
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candidates as well as candidate performance in the debate. Poor voter 
knowledge of candidates does not always disadvantage the candidate’s image, 
especially when another context, such as political debate, can confirm voters’ 
perceptions and expectations. In short, political debate provides an opportunity 
for judgment of a candidate’s image.   
 It is important to note that internal factors that come from the cognitive 
processes of voters also affect the way candidate image is constructed. After all, 
the basic theme of image is that it is concerned with subjective experience 
(Hacker, 2004). Earlier research by Kinder (1978), revealed that voters are more 
likely to construct positive sentiments of candidates who support the voter’s own 
opinions on politics, and more likely to have negative feelings towards a 
candidate who is not advocating similar positions to their own. As explained by 
Sears (1983), “perceived similarity should increase liking” (p. 233). The level of 
affection towards candidates is dependent on how they are perceived by voters. 
Study by Sears (1983) showed an interesting finding that voters opinions do not 
follow a simple relationship with candidate success, implying that expecting a 
candidate to win the election does not necessarily mean that they have positive 
opinions of the candidate. Moreover, the study also showed that people have a 
tendency to assign more weight to the negative features of candidates and set 
stricter attitudes than when evaluating the positive aspects of candidates. That is, 
one negative aspect of a candidate has the same weight as several positive 
aspects. These findings illustrated that there is a cognitive consistency between 
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what voters believe about political information and whether their own opinions 
are reinforced by the candidate’s positions.  
 As mentioned earlier, political actors use traditional media to mold their 
public persona (Kjeldahl, Carmichael, & Mertz, 1978) and in certain ways, media 
do shape citizens’ overall perceptions of a candidate’s image (Kiousis, 
Bantimaroudis, & Ban, 1999). Using the agenda-setting theoretical framework, 
researchers investigated how messages from the press transfer to the public. 
Media portrayals of a candidate’s personality traits through newspaper articles 
reflect what people actually think about candidates (Kiousis, Bantimaroudis, & 
Ban, 1999). However, media portrayals of a candidate’s personality attributes do 
not affect people’s general perceptions of the candidates. Most importantly, the 
dynamic of public opinion regarding images of candidates vary incrementally 
throughout the campaign trails in accordance with how the candidates were 
described in the news (Balmas & Sheafer, 2010). In addition, the more that 
people were exposed to news coverage regarding candidates’ attributes, the 
more they used this content as a basis for their evaluations. However, this more 
likely affected those who highly consumed newspapers.  
 Another way to understand how people formulate candidates’ images is 
through the appearance of a candidate him or herself. Many studies show that 
factors like physical appearance can sway people’s judgment, which later could 
either move people towards or away from the candidate (Johns & Shephard, 
2007; Todorov, Mandisodza, Goren, & Hall, 2005). In other words, judgments of 
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a candidate’s image through the assessment of their physical attributes can lead 
to subsequent measurement, such as voting decision. One explanation may be 
that “people may rely heavily on instant verdicts such as politician’s physical 
features” when making decisions on candidates (Johns & Shephard, 2007, p. 
435). Seeing a photograph of a politician, for example, was sufficient for 
constituents to make inferences about the candidate’s characteristics, such as 
their level of competency, honesty, and warmth (Johns & Shephard, 2007; 
Todorov et al., 2005). In fact, some political actors make an effort to enhance 
their physical appearance by manipulating their visual images through, for 
example, changing their hairstyle (Mater, Spezio, Kim, Todorov, Adolphs, & 
Alvarez, 2010). Moreover, it is also interesting to see how people can feel a 
sense of threat from photographs of the candidates; those who are perceived as 
a threat are less likely to be perceived positively in their image and less likely to 
be elected (Mater, Spezio, Kim, Todorov, Adolphs, & Alvarez, 2010) An important 
result of this study is that this condition was more likely to occur to those who did 
not have prior knowledge or at least have little source for other heuristic cues 
(Mater et. al., 2010). As argued by scholars, most voters do not collect in-depth 
information related to candidates, and in fact many voting decisions are based on 
only a few considerations (Neuman, 1986). Furthermore, previous studies have 
ruled out other factors such as candidate’s age, degree of attractiveness, and 
familiarity, as indicators mediating voters’ inferences regarding candidates’ 
competency, and their decisions in voting (Mater et., 2010).  
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 As previously mentioned, politicians employ several positive 
characteristics or traits to their public persona. Indeed, scholars have asserted 
the implication of image personality traits to the overall persona of prominent 
politicians, and revealed that each candidate has different qualities to show 
(Funk, 1999). Former U.S. president Bill Clinton, for example, was seen as a 
candidate with high sense of empathy towards citizens, whereas Jimmy Carter 
was perceived as a leader with high sense of honesty and integrity (Funk, 1999). 
However, an important part in understanding the relationship between a 
candidate’s image traits and the overall evaluation made by voters is that 
depending on the candidate, each trait can produce different evaluations for the 
candidate himself (Funk, 1999). In short, voters’ evaluations are not “simply 
based on the candidate’s competence and leadership effectiveness; instead, 
depending on the leader, certain traits may have a stronger influence on 
candidates’ evaluations” (Funk, 1999, p. 714). This is also dependent on the 
context of the election, and thus, each election has different type of image 
priming for each candidate.  
 In the case of Indonesia, many candidates in the 2004 presidential 
election primed certain image traits through the use of political advertisements on 
television (Prasetywan, 2012). The construction of their public images often 
reflected what they thought about the political situation in the country, and what 
they are desired to achieve when they became a leader. From their political 
advertisements, potential voters can recognize a deep sense of nationalism and 
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empathy towards the poor people in the country. Indeed, the characteristic of 
loving the country has been a classic image employed and recycled by many 
leaders in Indonesia’s politics (Prasetywan, 2012). In the American political 
context, campaigners are more likely to highlight certain issues. For example, 
Obama emphasized the issue of taxes (Kenski, Hardy, & Jameson, 2010). It can 
be suggested that in the 2009 Indonesian presidential election, the main strategy 
of the candidates “was forming certain personal characters” (Prasetywan, 2012, 
p. 311).  
 It appears that nontraditional media have the capacity to affect voters’ 
perceptions of candidates. Past research by Johnson, Braima, and Sothirajah 
(1999), for instance, found that politicians’ websites and the use of the Internet 
had considerable effects on the overall image of the candidate. Similarly, 
Dimitrova and Bystrom (2013) showed that the use of social media significantly 
affects voters’ perceptions of the candidates’ traits, especially for people who 
heavy social media users. Moreover, the study demonstrated that following 
candidates on Facebook lead to positive evaluations from voters, particularly 
evaluations related to the effectiveness of a candidate’s leadership and 
intelligence, but not honesty traits. The use of Facebook or exposure to a 
candidate’s Facebook page can produce more political participation from the 
voters (Vitak et. al., 2011). Prior research has documented that voters in general 
have their own “mental picture of specific characteristics that an ideal presidential 
candidate should have” (Grabe & Bucy, 2009, p. 101). One way to confirm their 
28 
 
expectations, is to examine campaign photographs displayed on candidate’s 
Facebook pages (Goodnow, 2013). Additionally, viewing negative online videos 
distributed on websites like YouTube can result in negative evaluations of a 
candidate’s image (Goodnow). Despite its benefits for candidates, the utilization 
of Facebook may produce new challenges as candidates have reduced levels of 
control over their online image (Bronstein, 2013; Gueorguieva, 2008).  
 In conclusion, many previous studies have shown the importance of image 
for candidate performance over the course of their campaign journey. Though a 
political message is an important factor, current impressions that voters have of 
candidates are essential to their verdicts regarding candidates’ images. 
Furthermore, voters’ construction of candidate image is greatly shaped by the 
traditional and nontraditional media through which candidates can present 
particular traits or characteristics as their public image. These different traits are 
treated differently by voters depending on the candidate himself. Overall, when it 
comes to political learning, especially in terms of a candidate’s image, voters 
have their own perceptions of idealized character for leader.  A lack of knowledge 
regarding a candidate’s character is not always a disadvantage for the 
campaigners since candidates have other avenues to promote the characters 
that they believe are favorable for potential voters, e.g. personal appearances 





THE 2014 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN INDONESIA 
 
In this chapter, I describe more generally the process of presidential 
election in Indonesia to show the political nuances of Indonesian elections. I then 
focus on the dynamics of the 2014 Indonesian presidential race and its distinct 
characteristics. 
Since Indonesia declared its independence from Dutch colonial rule in 
1945, it has conducted 11 elections in 1955, 1971, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 
1997, 1999, 2004, 2009, and 2014 (“History of Elections,” 2014). Election terms 
have varied in this time, but are usually for five years. After declaring 
independence in 1945, Indonesia adopted a parliamentary democracy, and 
appointed its first president, Sukarno. The first general elections were held in 
1955 (Ellis, 2016). At that time, the 257-seat People’s Representative Council 
(known as Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) were allocated regionally based on 
number of populations and the appointed President Sukarno to stay as president 
of the new Indonesian republic (Ellis). It is important to note that the 1945 
Constitution did not include a specific article that mentioned presidential office 
term, and thus, presidents had power exceeding the DPR (Crouch, 2010). 
In 1959, due to the unstable political environment, President Sukarno 
enacted a decree to abolish the parliament council and formed the Provisional 
People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara, 
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MPRS), which consisted of both civil and military representatives (Ismanto & 
Legowo, 2004). With this presidential decree, Sukarno had complete power to 
facilitate his autocratic political rule known as the Guided Democracy (Ismanto & 
Legowo, 2004; Indrayana, 2007). The decree also eventually allowed Sukarno to 
be elected by the majority of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), as 
president for life until Suharto replaced him in 1967 (Maarif, 1996). The MPR is 
the highest constitutional body whose main task is to approve the policy 
guidelines every five years (International Business Publications, 2013).   
When Suharto officially took office in 1967, the authoritarian governance 
was still actively operating along with a proliferation of corruption, which 
eventually led to more political turbulence that reached its turning point in 1998 
with the overthrow of Suharto’s regime (Suryadinata, 2002). As an important 
note, Suharto’s government was similar to Sukarno’s administration in that there 
was only one candidate to contest the presidential electoral race (Crouch, 2010). 
Sukarno was appointed for four terms and served in office for more than two 
decades, while Suharto, appointed in 1967 after a military coup, remained 
president for six terms in a 32-year period (Crouch, 2010). 
In the post-Suharto era, the convergence of civil movements brought 
about the Reformation, with the hope of bringing a more liberal political structure 
to the political process (Crouch, 2010; Ellis, 2016). One political reform occurring 
in this period was the reduction of the number of MPR members from 700 to 200 
seats (Thalang, 2005). Another alteration was the formation of a multiparty 
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parliament without having majority numbers (Thalang, 2005). Consequently, 
presidential elections became less systematic and involved more hidden political 
transactions between leaders of parties with popular votes (Lamoureux, 2003; 
Rinakit, 2005; Thalang, 2005). Megawati Sukarnoputri, for instance, leader of the 
Indonesian Democratic Party Struggle (PDI-P) and the daughter of Indonesia’s 
first president Sukarno, received the most votes in the 1999 presidential election 
(without majority) but Abdurrahman Wahid was the one chosen as president by 
the members of MPR (Mietzner, 2000; Thalang, 2005).  
It was obvious during the initial stage of the Reformation era that the 
process of presidential election remained the same, i.e. the MPR had the 
authority to appoint the new president and vice president (Suryadinata, 2002). 
Moreover, in the case of Indonesia, indirect election seemed to be one of the 
threats creating an imbalance between the executive and the legislative, which 
resulted in a fragile position for the president. In other words, indirect election of 
the president by the MPR made it easier for the MPR members to remove the 
president from his or her position at any time (Grote & Roder, 2011). For 
example, in the case of President Abdurrahman Wahid, the MPR dismissed him 
from the presidential office in July 2001 due to the lack of political support from 
the political majority members (Grote & Roder, 2011), and replaced him with 
President Megawati Sukarnoputri (Kim, 2008). This incident illustrates how, after 
the downfall of Suharto, Indonesian presidents could not use their substantial 
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power “as freely as those experienced by the directly elected presidents” (Grote 
& Roder, 2011, p. 467).  
In 2001, during President Megawati Sukarnoputri’s administration, the 
MPR amended the 1945 Constitution with the specific intention of implementing 
direct presidential elections (Hosen, 2007; Thalang, 2005). A year later, the 
fourth amendment became effective and required presidential and vice-
presidential candidates to compete as a single pair (Hosen, 2007; Thalang, 
2005). With the new amendment, only political parties or a party coalition that 
garnered at least three per cent of the seats of the DPR or five per cent of the 
vote in legislative elections are qualified to nominate a presidential team (Hosen, 
2007; “IBP”, 2012; Thalang, 2005).  
In 2004, using the new electoral laws, voters were allowed for the first time 
to choose the president through direct election (Ellis, 2016). The election was 
held with a two-round majority system, meaning that victory could only be 
determined by having more than 50 per cent of total votes or at least 20 per cent 
of the vote from each province (Lindsay, 2009; Dagg, 2007). If there were 
inadequate voting numbers in the first round, the second round was executed. 
Along with that, in 2004, the presidential term was also established to be only two 
consecutive five-year terms similar to the U.S. system (Dagg, 2007). The 
average Indonesian citizen considers the 2004 direct presidential election to be 
more democratic and transparent compared with the preceding elections 
(Suryadinata, 2005). The procedure itself, however, was still clouded by the 
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hidden political agendas of parties with popular votes. The PDI-P, for example, 
was proposing a bill that required the presidential candidate to have no criminal 
record as a way to block Golkar party’s chairman Akbar Tanjung from the 
presidency (Suryadinata, 2005).  
The presidential threshold in the 2009 and 2014 elections was raised to 20 
per cent of seats or 25 per cent of legislative election votes (Dagg, 2007; “Rumah 
Pemilu”, 2014). Similar to the 2004 election, many people perceived the 2009 
election as “fair and free” (Ufen, 2010, p. 282). Furthermore, the 2009 election 
was featuring familiar political elites with three president-vice president pairs in 
total. The situation was slightly different in the 2014 presidential election. One 
distinct feature of 2014 presidential election was the process itself, which did not 
involve a second-round victory since there were only two president-vice president 
pairs of candidates competing for the presidency.   
The Dynamic of the 2014 Indonesia Presidential Election 
In the 2014 presidential election, the General Commission of Election 
(KPU) stated that there were 190 million Indonesian voters nationally, tripling the 
2009 election (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, 2014). At that time, the ongoing process 
of Indonesia’s young democracy had continued to flourish and had reached its 
turning point. One distinct feature of the 2014 presidential election was the 
process itself, which did not involve a second-round victory since there were only 
two pairs of president-vice president candidates who competed for the 
presidency. The nominated presidential candidates were Joko Widodo, popularly 
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known as Jokowi, a former mayor of Solo, and Prabowo Subianto who was the 
former army strategic reserve commander. Many were concerned that the 2014 
direct presidential contest posed a threat to Indonesia’s democracy itself since 
one of the candidates, former Special Forces General Prabowo Subianto, was 
eager to return the indirect electoral system (Mietzner, 2014). Many citizens were 
also worried that Prabowo would set out the old attribute of authoritarianism to 
Indonesia’s political system (Mietzner, 2014).  The 2014 presidential election was 
a key moment in Indonesian political history because Indonesia experienced the 
threat of returning to an authoritarian regime under Prabowo who was dubbed by 
media and political experts as the oligarchic politician (Aspinall, 2015). Despite 
the fact that Prabowo lost to Jokowi, the emergence of antidemocratic elites is 
still heavily visible (Mietzner, 2014; Fukuoka & Thalang, 2014).  
Before the official campaign period started, the 2014 election featured 
familiar elite politicians including Prabowo Subianto, Megawati Sukarnoputri, and 
Aburizal Bakrie (chairman of Golkar’s party). These politicians were well-known 
for their important roles as chairmen and chairwoman of their parties (Fukuoka & 
Thalang, 2014).  However, due to their lack of popularity, Megawati and Bakrie 
lost their chances of being nominated, paving the way for Prabowo to contest the 
presidential election (Fukuoka & Thalang, 2014). The mood of 2014’s election 
changed once Jokowi decided to join the presidential race (Fukuoka & Thalang, 
2014). Socially, Jokowi’s popularity developed from his contribution as the mayor 
of Solo in Central Java, and his popularity climbed significantly when he won 
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Jakarta’s gubernatorial election in 2012 (Fukuoka & Thalang, 2014). Initially, 
Prabowo and Megawati endorsed Jokowi’s bid for Jakarta’s governorship, in the 
hopes of improving their popularity for the presidential election (Fukuoka & 
Thalang, 2014). Eventually, Jokowi’s popularity became the most important 
factor and Megawati nominated Jokowi as the PDI-P’s presidential candidate 
(Fukuoka & Thalang, 2014). Ironically, as the PDI-P chairwoman, Megawati 
broke a political agreement, acknowledged as Batu Tulis pact, that stipulated her 
commitment to support the nomination of Prabowo as the presidential candidate 
in the 2014 election prior to Jokowi s official nomination (Widhiarto, 2014). 
Indeed, the 2014 presidential election was a tight competition between Jokowi 
and Prabowo (Fukuoka & Thalang, 2014; Mietzner, 2014; Tornquist, 2014).  
The emergence of the populist leader Jokowi and his opponent Prabowo 
should be understood within the context of former president Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono’s activity (Mietzner, 2014; Fukuoka & Thalang, 2014). During 
Yudhoyono’s presidency between 2004 and 2012, Indonesia’s economy grew 
exponentially with the per capita income rising from $1,161 to $3,557, a process 
supported by the expansion of middle-class citizens (Mietzner, 2014; Tornquist, 
2014). In terms of the political situation, Yudhoyono managed to settle the 
ongoing crises from the previous administration, such as the ongoing war in Aceh 
(Mietzner, 2014). Yudhoyono also made a great effort to eradicate corruption in 
the government as well as manifesting bureaucracy reform (Tornquist, 2014). 
However, in the years prior to the 2014 election, Yudhoyono’s administration 
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started to show drawbacks involving enduring corruption cases and collusions 
that ironically came from his own party, the Democratic Party (PD) (Tornquist, 
2014). The general public was also exposed to stories about how certain 
members of the parliament, specifically those who come from Yudhoyono’s own 
party, were involved in “money politics” issues (Tornquist, 2014). Accordingly, 
Yudhoyono’s popularity declined significantly along with the popularity of his 
party (Tornquist, 2014).  
Strategically, both candidates Jokowi and Prabowo used the weaknesses 
of Yudhoyono’s administration for their political advantage, although in different 
ways (Tornquist 2014; Mietzner, 2014). Prabowo, for example, promised to 
protect the nation’s natural resources and used nationalist rhetoric to condemn 
the proliferation of corruption (Mietzner, 2014). As explained by Fukuoka and 
Thalang (2014), Prabowo also reinvented his political persona as a decisive 
leader, which was a sharp contrast to Yudhoyono’s image. Jokowi, in contrast, 
was branding himself as an ordinary Indonesian with a nonchalant manner, 
which made him looked approachable and seemingly docile, unlike the typical 
Indonesian politician (Mietzner, 2014).  
The Role of Social Media in Election in Indonesia 
After explaining the role of social media within the context of political 
elections in a general sense, it is important to have information about social 
media in the context of Indonesia. First, this section will briefly discuss the role of 
the Internet in Indonesia’s politics followed by the role of social media in the 
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election process. Initially, the Internet was widely used within the university 
environment and later moved to the wider civil society in 1995 (Hill, 2003). In 
1996, at the time of Internet use expansion, an online forum called Apakabar (an 
expression equivalent to “how are you”) emerged as an important cyberspace for 
Indonesian netizens to discuss political matters. The forum has been working as 
an outlet that allows its active users to communicate relevant actions against the 
regime of Suharto and thus provide a catalyst for forming and expressing public 
opinion (Nurhadryani, Maslow, & Yamamoto, 2009).  
It is noticeable that during the Suharto’s administration, media and 
ordinary citizens were strictly controlled by the government and political 
expression was impossible. The oppressive situation was deepened by the Asian 
financial crisis that firstly hit Thailand in 1997 before spreading through 
Indonesia. The crisis caused significant disturbances to the nation in general, 
and to the Suharto’s administration in particular (“Asian Financial Crisis”, n.d.; 
Nurhadryani, Maslow, & Yamamoto, 2009). In this situation, the cyberspace that 
was embedded in the far-reaching political change received momentum that 
increased the flow of the change (Yangyue, 2011). Most importantly, the Internet 
progressively facilitated and enhanced the political activity of Indonesians and 
played an important role at the end of the Suharto “New Order” regime 
(Nurhadryani, Maslow, & Yamamoto, 2009). During that period, the Internet 
complemented traditional mass media in voicing “the corruption, collusion, and 
nepotism surrounding the authoritarian regime of Suharto” (Nurhadryani, Maslow, 
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& Yamamoto, 2009, p. 217). It can be seen from this situation that the Internet 
served as a tool for ordinary Indonesians to challenge the existing government 
(Lim, 2006).    
The Internet started to show its potential in electoral campaigns during the 
1997 elections, when it became clear that political parties could derive value from 
having an official Internet site (Hill, 2003). Several Indonesian commentators 
perceived the Internet as an effective campaign method, especially for parties 
that did not have printed media as their means of communication. Moreover, the 
Internet allowed parties to disseminate information without passing through the 
protocols issued by the Minister of Information. Although the Internet was a 
convenient campaign tool, the lack of infrastructure made the implementation of 
online campaigns difficult in the country. As a result, political parties put more 
effort into more established strategies involving traditional media (TV, radio, and 
print), rallies, and motorcade parades (Ahyani, 1999; Hill, 2003).  
Since the 1997 election, the incorporation of the Internet in electoral 
campaigns has slowly but steadily increased (Nurhadryani, Maslow, & 
Yamamoto, 2009). Political actors and parties began to utilize the Internet more 
often in their campaigns during the 2009 elections, as illustrated by regular 
maintenance of a party’s website, electronic communication with visitors, and the 
presence of personal blogs (Nurhadryani, Maslow, & Yamamoto, 2009). The 
Commission of Election (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, KPU) also utilized the Internet 
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for tabulating voting results that allowed the public to see the counting process 
nationally (Hill, 2003).    
Unfortunately, just like traditional media, the Internet can be used to 
undermine a candidate’s persona and affect public opinion in the offline realm 
(Nurhadryani, Maslow, & Yamamoto, 2009). In the 2009 presidential election, for 
example, a Facebook group was dedicated to rejecting Megawati’s candidacy 
and soon interfered with her popularity in real life. Similar cases also occurred 
during the 2014 presidential election where candidates received aggressive 
smear campaign in social media. Just five weeks before the election day due, the 
anti-Prabowo campaign was mainly stressing his past involvement in the 
kidnapping of pro-democracy activists in May 1998 (Halim & Aritonang, 2014; 
Fukuoka & Thalang, 2014). Meanwhile, Jokowi was misleadingly accused of 
being non-Muslim with Chinese-descent, and he was also heavily portrayed as a 
political puppet of Megawati (Halim & Aritonang, 2014; Fukuoka & Thalang, 
2014; Paath & Maulia, 2015). 
 Social media began to play a pivotal role in Indonesia’s politics during the 
presidential election in 2014 (Azali, 2014).  Although the number of Internet users 
only reached around 71.19 million of the 250 million Indonesian citizens, Internet 
penetration has continued to increase on a regular basis (Azali, 2014; “Number 
of RI”, 2014). As mentioned earlier, in 2014 Indonesia was reported to be the 
country with the fourth highest number of Facebook users and also placed 
among the top five in terms of the highest Twitter users across the globe in 2012 
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(Azali, 2014; Socialbakers, 2014; Semiocast, 2012). In fact, as reported by 
several online media, 200 million interactions involving the process of Indonesia’s 
presidential election were circling around Facebook between March and July 
2014 (Azali, 2014; Schonhardt, 2014; “Look Back At”, 2014). This online activity 
reached its peak closer to the election times when users posted hashtags related 
to the presidential candidates (e.g. #Jokowi9juli and #Pilih_No1_PrabowoHatta) 
which resulted in topics trending nationally and internationally (Azali, 2014, 
“Social Media During”, 2014).   
 Both presidential candidates, Prabowo and Jokowi used social media 
strategies on Facebook and Twitter in their campaign (Azali, 2014; Abdillah, 
2014). While Prabowo’s online campaign was official and systematic, Jokowi’s 
online campaign was administered by volunteers and without formal coordination 
(Azali, 2014). In practice, Prabowo heavily used Facebook, from which he gained 
around 7 million likes (Abdillah, 2014; Facebook, 2014). Even though there was 
no official interaction between Prabowo and the Facebook page visitors, the 
page was regularly updated to reflect the situation in the offline environment 
(Facebook, 2014). Jokowi had more than 2 million likes from his unofficial 
Facebook page (Facebook, 2014). On Twitter, Jokowi had 1.65 million followers, 
while Prabowo only managed to have about 900 thousand followers (O’Neil, 
2014).  
Most Indonesian users utilize social media to fulfill social interaction 
purposes (Lim, 2013). As stated by Lim (2013), politics was not the focus of 
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users’ online activities but rather “located on the fringe of their social activities” 
(Lim, 2013, p. 639). However, this situation changed during the election period 
when political discourse became the main topic and dominated conversation in 
the digital landscape. To illustrate, we can use data provided by Bubu.com, a 
local digital agency that collaborated with Facebook in creating a tracker 
application to monitor Facebook user’s conversation related to the 2014 
presidential election (Lestari, 2014). Bubu.com reported that 70% of the 
conversations relevant to election occurred on Facebook, with 44.04% of the 
total conversations being about Prabowo, and 52.47% being related to Jokowi 
(Lestari). 
The results of the election revealed that Jokowi won the 2014 presidential 
race. Many considered that his presidency would support the growing process of 
democracy in Indonesia (Fukuoka & Thalang, 2014). Although Jokowi holds the 
top position in the country, many political experts assumed that he would not be 
able to separate his duty and his commitment to his Chairwoman, Megawati, and 
therefore, Megawati would likely to influence how Jokowi established and 
approved policies (Fukuoka & Thalang, 2014). Furthermore, Jokowi was forced 
to reach out to the party of his competitor because his coalition has only 40 per 
cent of parliamentary seats (Fukuoka & Thalang, 2014; Chen, 2014).    
In conclusion, the Internet and social media have provided an alternative 
place for Indonesian users to express political opinions. Initially, the Internet 
managed to accelerate the political change that challenged the stability of 
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Suharto’s regime. During the earlier times of the direct election, Internet also 
allowed political parties and actors to test the benefits of setting up online 
campaigns. Although the limited infrastructure may become a constraint for 
online campaigning, Internet penetration has continued to grow on a regular 
basis with social media users’ enthusiasm increasing significantly during the 
2014 presidential election. One important aspect to note is that the role of social 
media in facilitating the election process continues even after the ballot papers 
have been collected (Azali, 2014, p. 1). At this stage, social media works as a 
tool to monitor the counting process and make sure that there was no room for 
manipulation (Azali, 2014). It can also be inferred that the use of social media like 
Facebook, for example, brings desirable outcomes in terms of a candidate’s 
image. In fact, just by following a candidate’s Facebook page, voters are more 
likely to give positive evaluations, i.e. ascribing positive characteristics to the 
candidate involving leadership and competency traits (Dimitrova & Bystrom, 
2013). However, negative videos distributed through video sharing websites (i.e. 
Youtube) can focus negative attention on a candidate’s image in general, which 







This study employs a thematic analysis to investigate the Facebook 
postings of Indonesian users before the 2014 Presidential Election in Indonesia. 
The following reviews the methodology of the analysis.  
Epistemological Approach 
The epistemological approach adopted in this study is interpretive (social 
constructivist). Within this paradigm, the researcher takes as a point of departure 
the assumption that reality is constructed in the interaction between humans and 
that the researcher’s job is to understand, interpret and explain these shared 
interpretations of reality (Keyton, 2006). Consequently, the postings, taken 
together, represent a form of discourse, and the aim of the analysis is to 
understand the main themes around which the discourse of the users revolved 
when constructing images of the two candidates. 
Sample 
The data collection venue was candidate Prabowo Subianto’s (PS) official 
Facebook page. The candidate’s page, which was managed by his campaign 
team, included photos of the candidate with his family, photos of the campaign, 
video clips in which celebrities endorsed the candidate, the candidate’s 
comments about his contender, the candidate’s communication with his public, 
as well as the candidate’s response to user’s comments. The study only included 
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comments from PS’s Facebook because his page was legitimately generated by 
him and his public relations team and the content was structured systematically. 
Therefore, the public may have had a sense that their comments were 
recognized and acknowledged by PS. This quasi-official forum, therefore, was 
less likely to be “trolled” or to be “hijacked” by users with a different agenda. It 
would have been interesting to collect postings from the Facebook page of the 
second candidate, Joko Widodo (JW). Unfortunately, his Facebook page was not 
the official page of the candidate and was subsequently deactivated. Therefore, 
the decision to focus on one venue only was motivated by both data availability 
and the legitimacy of the collection site. Data were collected during the period of 
June 20, 2014 to July 8, 2014 totaling 20 days before the actual election day, on 
July 9 of 2014. This period was thought be critical because during this time, the 
dynamics of political discussions among users were reaching their peak as the 
election day became closer.  
To collect a sample of user comments, I selected the story with the 
highest number of shares, posted on June 19, 2014. This story is a video clip 
made by Indonesian local artists with Indonesian idol contestants endorsing the 
candidate (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y0LzsVJT9IE). Between the 
posting date and July 8, 2014, the story received more than 30,601 shares 
(Facebook, 2014). A story with the most shares denotes high popularity and has 
a higher tendency of going viral over the cyberspace. Using a third-party 
computer software called “The Facebook Grabber,” I collected a sample of 5,782 
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comments from a total of 18,950 comments on the story during the indicated time 
period. Out of the 5, 782 comments, 11 percent of the comments derived from 
the opponents of Prabowo. The consideration for choosing this number was 
because the system of the computer software could only manage to grab some 
portion of the comments. Additionally, the software was designed to operate 
within Microsoft Windows system where it allows data extraction from any 
specific date of a Facebook story taken from one’s Facebook page. Once 
specific date is specified, the software will grab the comments automatically and 
restored on a table provided by the software. Moreover, the software also allows 
to shift the collected comments on the table to Microsoft Excel, which later 
permits me as researcher to import the comments to another computer program 
like ATLAS.ti. Importantly, the software grabbed whichever comments were 
promoted by the Facebook algorithm. The ordering of comments on Facebook 
operates based on social order (the default setting), time, and reverse time 
(Facebook, 2017). With the social setting, comments generated from friends or 
friends from friends would be displayed first, whereas comments labeled as 
spam would not be shown on the wall. Comments ordered by time are displayed 
from oldest to newest with the newest comments shown at the bottom. In the 
reverse time order, the newest comments are shown at the top of the list 
(Facebook, 2017). Therefore, the sample of comments is not a probability 
sample. However, I have no reason to suspect that the ordering of the comments 
depended on the opinion expressed by users. Therefore, from the point of view 
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of the topic I am analyzing (how users construct a candidate’s image), the 
sample is, in fact, a random snapshot. In general, the comments contained less 
than 101 words, ranging from 4-100 words.  
Data were collected via convenience sampling, which is a nonprobability 
method. Convenience sampling is an easy way to collect data that allows 
researcher “to select respondents that are convenient for his or her research as 
participants” (Keyton, 2006, p. 126). Although, convenience sampling has a large 
potential for bias and respondents do not have equal chances of being selected 
in the study, it is considered to be effective and quickly absorbs large numbers of 
data (Jennings, 2010, as cited in Amaro, Henriques, & Duarte, 2016). 
Furthermore, convenience sampling is considered appropriate for the current 
study since the nature of the study is not predicting a phenomenon, but instead, it 
is interpretative research. Therefore, it would be less problematic as the study is 
not trying to make inferences from a sample to population (Keyton, 2006; 
Stanovich, 1986). 
Analytical Stance: Thick Description 
The aim of my analysis is to generate thick description of the phenomenon 
I am investigating; namely, how voters construct candidate image. Thick 
description is considered an important element in qualitative research texts; and 
it can be referred to as an in-depth interpretative process of describing a social 
life and it is grounded in the perspective of members who are involved in the 
event (emic view) (Geertz, 1973; Given, 2008). It was first introduced by 
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anthropologist Clifford Geertz, who adopted the concept from the metaphysical 
philosopher Gilbert Ryle (Given, 2008). Essentially, for Ryle, thick description 
entails not only an understanding of the behavior, but also involves the 
interpretation of the behavior that operates in certain contexts as well as 
“ascribing thinking and intentionality to the observed behavior” (Ponterotto, 2006, 
p. 539). As further explained by Denzin (2001), thick description “presents detail, 
context, emotion, and the webs of social relationships that join persons to one 
another” (p. 100). Denzin (2001) notes that thick description contains “the ability 
of capturing and representing the meanings of a particular action or sequence of 
actions has for the individuals in question” (p. 116). From these explanations, 
thick description is more than just a description of a factual situation or 
experience, but is more about an interpretative approach of description as a way 
to create “verisimilitude to the reader,“ according to Denzin (1989) (as cited in 
Thompson, 2001, p. 67). Additionally, according to Thompson (2001), “although 
thick description comes from the field of anthropology, communication scholars 
argued that it is appropriate for communication research” (p. 66), because “the 
study of culture can also be called the study of communications, for what we are 
studying in the context are the ways in which experience is worked into 
understanding and the disseminated and celebrated” (as cited in Carey, 1989, p. 
34).  
As mentioned above, Geertz’s (1973) thick description comes from “Ryle’s 
lecture where he discussed the concept of thick description to explain one’s 
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behavior” (as cited in Ponterroto, 2006, p. 539), and Geertz further explained 
what Ryle means by the concept of “wink” and “blink.” In discussing wink and 
blink, Geertz highlighted that the ethnographer or observer must know and 
interpret the intention that drives certain behavior or actions (Thompson, 2001). 
To obtain a rich interpretation, “observers must have a deep understanding of the 
context of the situation” (Thompson, 2001, p. 66). This means that the observer 
must go beyond the description stage, and instead, also understand “the 
underlying inferences and implications” (Geertz, 1973, p. 9). Moreover, Greetz 
(1973) also emphasized that in the process of thick description, the essential part 
is that the writing was “really our own construction of other people’s constructions 
of what they and their compatriots are up to” (p. 9). For the observers to produce 
credible work, the interpretation must be “richly and thickly described” 
(Ponterroto, 2006, p. 539).     
Thick description is effective and applicable to the current study because 
the study’s aim is to go beyond describing the behavior and meanings that 
existed in the online social interaction of Facebook users. The study is intended 
to interpret and translate the actions and organize those actions, which are 
grounded on a particular context, so that we can understand the complexity of 
the actions. 
Thematic Analysis 
To produce a thick description of the users’ discourse, I employed 
thematic analysis to my data. Thematic analysis is suitable for answering the 
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research question since it tries to interpret an aspect of the phenomenon that lies 
in the empirical data, and to understand the meaning of a text (Boyatzis, 1998). 
As further explained by Benedict (2014), thematic analysis is a method of 
analysis that can be used “to identify, synthesize, analyze, and offer perception 
into the patterns of meanings collected in the data” (p. 45). With this method, the 
analysis utilizes an encoding process that involves an explicit “code, which can 
be manifested into different forms, such as a collection of themes, indicators, and 
qualifications that are connected to one another” (Boyatzis, 1998, p. 4). On a 
small scale, a theme can be described as “a pattern that organizes the basic 
units of observation, whereas on the larger scale, a theme can reveal an aspect 
of a phenomenon” (Boyatzis, 1998, p. 4). In the process of analysis, a theme of a 
coding category can refer to observable things found in the data, or something 
that is more implicitly hidden in the observed data (Joffe & Yardley, 2004).  
Essentially, the themes can be derived inductively or deductively depending upon 
the source of the data (Boyatzis, 1998). In this study, the themes emerged 
inductively, since they appeared from raw information collected from Facebook 
comments. The inductive thematic analysis has some similarities with the 
grounded theory approach (Braun & Clarke, 2006). However, it is important to 
note that a researcher’s preconception, personal experience, and knowledge 
may affect the identification of the themes, which may not make it an entirely 
inductive or deductive approach (Joffe & Yardley, 2004).  
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Scholars have identified several steps in conducting thematic analyses. 
Braun and Clarke (2006), for example, organize six stages that include “being 
familiarized with the collected data, constructing initial codes, forming the codes, 
conducting code review, defining the themes and naming them, and finally, 
generating the report” (p. 35). Braun and Clarke further asserted that thematic 
analysis is a flexible and useful research tool that “potentially provide[s] a rich 
and detailed, yet complex account of data” (p. 5). 
Another way to conduct thematic analysis can also be concluded from 
Boyatzis’s (1998) method who specifically identified three different steps of 
developing codes and themes, which are subjective to how the data is derived. 
For the data-driven type, Boyatzis outlined three stages that involve a step-by-
step coding guide. In the initial phase, processing, a researcher should recognize 
important aspects in his or her data. This is followed by encoding the data before 
continuing to do the interpretation. Moreover, a researcher must recognize that “a 
good code is one that captures the qualitative richness of the phenomenon” 
(Boyatzis, 1998, p. 1). The first stage involves selecting the design as well as the 
subsamples within the data. The second stage includes code development where 
the researcher develops themes on each subsample. The third stage 
incorporates those themes found in the second stage of the coding, followed by 
interpreting the discovered themes, concepts or conclusions.  
For my analysis, I used the following process. After collecting users’ 
comments using the Facebook Grabber software program mentioned above, I 
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continued to work on my data by transferring the data to Microsoft Excel. By 
looking the data on Excel, I would be able to trace the dates of the posting more 
easily. I restrict my data extraction by making sure that the comments were not 
exceeding the selected time frame, which was the July 8, 2014. Once I checked 
that all comments fulfilled the required selection then I translated the 5, 782 
comments from the users’ native language (Bahasa Indonesia) to English, 
verbatim. With the translated version, I imported the data to ATLAS.ti computer 
program in order to aid the coding process digitally. In the initial stage, I included 
a full sentence of each comment to identify potential codes by allowing myself 
freely to detect any possible conclusions that can occur from the comments. Also 
at this stage, I tried to be familiarized with the users’ comments as much as 
possible. Generally, I applied the first coding cycle by employing exploratory 
coding methods, which is holistic coding. Holistic coding is a method which tries 
“to grasp basic themes of issues in the data by absorbing them as a whole (the 
coder as “lumper”) rather than by analyzing them line by line” (Dey, 1993, p. 
104). Furthermore, holistic coding is also suitable for a novice researcher who is 
in the earlier stages of learning how to code data, and as suggested by Saldana 
(2009), “the method is time-saving for those who deal with large amounts of data” 
(p. 166). During this cycle I carried the decoding and encoding process to 
capture the repetitive patterns of the users’ comments. To name a few, I 
managed to generate 50 codes, involving nationalism, negative characteristics, 
foreign nations, celebrity endorsement, faith, candidate’s achievement, and 
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exposing the effect of Prabowo. In ATLAS.ti I also wrote some analytical memos 
as a reference of what the codes meant.  
In the next step, I grouped the codes into more meaningful categories and 
reduced the number of codes and categories which would produce “a more 
compact set of data coded” (Saldåna, 2009, p. 232). For example, I recoded 
“exposing the effect of Prabowo” to “addressing Prabowo’s political past”. 
Moreover, I was also recategorizing some of the initial categories. For instance, I 
recategorized celebrity endorsement and group expression to collective image 
category. As an attempt to explore the data coded, I used a second cycle coding 
method, which was pattern coding. As explained by Saldana, “the pattern coding 
is the one that identify an emergent theme or configuration, or explanation. They 
pull together a lot of material from first cycle coding into more meaningful and 
parsimonious unit of analysis” (p. 236). At this stage, I consolidated the 
categories into several themes. As explained by Rallis and Rossman (2003), a 
category is more of a “word or phrase that represents some segment of the data 
that is explicit, while a theme is a phrase or sentence that describe subtler or tacit 
processes” (p. 282). Based on my data reading, I managed to identify several 
themes, such as the strategies for constructing the image of the candidate 
through the construction of identities involving national identity and collective 
identity. There were also strategies using inferences based on metaphor, 
inferences based on political past, inferences based on how they were treated by 
other people, inferences based on the future state of the country, and inferences 
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based on spiritual values. During the writing process, I analyzed how these 
themes work together to construct the image of the candidate. 
For the validation process, I attempted to validate my themes by asking a 
graduate student with no prior knowledge of the research topic to read 500 
random comments and answer several questions such as: “What discursive 
strategies are being used to construct the identity of the candidates?”; “How are 
national and collective identities being used to construct the candidates?”; and, 




THEMATIC ANALYSIS OF CANDIDATE IMAGE CONSTRUCTION 
 
The analysis will focus on several themes that demonstrate a candidate’s 
image and the construction of several identities to show how users create 
idealized images of presidential candidates. These involve construction of 
national identity and group identity. The analysis will also show how users 
construct a candidate’s image through inferences based on personality traits, 
political scandal, elements of spiritual values, projection of the future state of the 
country, and inferences based on their treatment by others. 
Candidate Image and The Construction of National Identity 
Social media users related the image of their chosen candidate to the 
image of the ideal candidate who is capable of addressing the many issues that, 
in their view, confront the nation. An important dimension of candidate image 
construction is related to the construction of national identity and how the 
candidate might be able to act as a strong defender of national rights and the 
national image in foreign policy contexts. The renewal of national identity or 
nationalist feelings can occur through numerous everyday routines (such as 
subtle language, symbols, and objects) through which the citizenry are 
continually reminded of being a part of a particular nation (Billig, 1995; Baruh & 
Popescu, 2008; & Wade, 2011). This phenomenon is what Billig (1995) defined 
as “banal nationalism”, which according to Baruh and Popescu (2008) captures 
55 
 
“the sense of ‘us versus them’ divisions ingrained in people’s habits of speech, or 
the never-questioned and ever-communicated beliefs about the glory of a 
nation’s past that reproduces national identity at the level of people’s discursive 
experience” (p. 84). In the context of contemporary Indonesia, various kinds of 
“everyday nationalism” are practiced and recycled, with a high reference to the 
anti-colonial struggle, the struggle with neighboring nations over territorial claims, 
and Indonesia’s economic position in Asia (Aspinall, 2016). An interesting 
example of how “banal nationalism” is incorporated into digital media is a video 
game known as “Nusantara Online,” which allows its players to experience a 
role-playing, patriotic-themed gaming session within a historical landscape of 
three kingdoms in Indonesia i.e., Majapahit, Pajajaran, and Sriwijaya kingdoms 
(Zulkarnain, 2014). More specifically, players are able to immerse in several 
journeys that are loosely based on the history of one of the kingdoms that they 
have selected. As explained by Zulkarnain (2014), “the game highlights the role 
of “playable” nationalism as a contemporary practice of national identity 
formation” (p. 46). Indeed, the ongoing practice of “banal nationalism” in 
Indonesia was clearly revealed in how users constructed the image of the 
presidential candidate Prabowo.  
As a former lieutenant general, Prabowo’s military roots were always 
evident in how the political discourse of his campaign courted a nationalistic 
perspective that promoted economic power with the intention of protecting 
national assets from foreign intervention or interests. His idea of economic 
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nationalism relied on cultivating natural resources with specific attention to 
maximizing the agricultural sector and promoting Indonesia as an agrarian 
country (Aspinall, 2015). Prabowo’s approach was heavily reliant on increasing 
local commodities so that food production can be made locally, while at the same 
time minimizing imported ingredients (Aspinall). Furthermore, Prabowo 
highlighted how the Indonesian government failed to protect agricultural 
treasures and the position of local farmers, and instead devised policies that 
increased the dependence on imported agriculture commodities (“Agricultural 
Issues More Important”, 2014). For him, it was ironic to see how Indonesia 
imported so many food crops and saltwater fish despite the country’s agricultural 
surplus. 
 The analysis of user comments revealed that references to national 
identity were very common throughout the postings of Prabowo’s supporters. The 
online social interaction among users showed the shared negative sentiment 
towards foreign intervention and foreign companies—the mood of anti-
colonialism—and the desire to be respected by other nations. A recurring motif 
was the users’ strong emotional reactions to rejecting foreign intervention with 
specific attention given to the issue of separatism and national policy. As 
mentioned by one of the users, “it is a matter of urgency to break the intervention 
of foreign governments for the sake of our national identity and to hold our 
national union together preventing separation essentially…I feel so angry inside 
when seeing foreign countries messing with our affairs” (comment posted on 
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June 21, 2014) It is not surprising to see a high prevalence of statements 
projected at foreign governments related to separation issues, considering 
territorial sovereignty has always been a sensitive issue and an integral element 
for Indonesia. What is surprising, however, is how some users believed that the 
Indonesian government may easily become a target of surveillance by foreign 
nations. In this context, the ideal candidate would be a strong figure capable of 
deterring foreign intervention. For example, one user stated, “We need a strong 
political figure so it will deter foreign intelligence to spy on our government or 
even stop them finding a way of breaking us apart” (comment posted on June 22, 
2014); while another user wrote, “Indonesia should have a clear intelligence 
agreement with foreign nations so it will protect bilateral relationships and 
national unity” (comment posted on June 22, 2014).  
To a certain degree, this desire for a strong leader with investment in 
national anti-surveillance politics can be explained as a reaction to the 
scandalous documents released by the former NSA agent, Edward Snowden, in 
late 2013, which showed Australia’s intelligence eavesdropping into the 
communication of several Indonesian political figures, including the mobile phone 
of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2009 (Frost, 2016). As a political 
response, the Indonesian government recalled its ambassador to Australia as 
well as suspended military cooperation before negotiations reached an 
agreement in October 2014 (Frost, 2016).   
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Other users stated their emotional distress directed at a government 
which, allegedly, was not taking a more aggressive stance to oppose foreign 
intervention, and their desire for a strong candidate who could stand up to a 
foreign power. For instance, one user reported, “I just want to hit my head on the 
wall knowing that foreign powers were affecting the policy makers. The new 
government should be more cautious and clever enough to limit foreign 
intervention or else we will be doomed” (comment posted on June 22, 2014).  It 
appears here that this user thought that foreign powers had considerable 
influence over important matters in Indonesia and that foreign powers were a 
national threat. Several postings concerning island claims by neighboring 
countries around Indonesia had the tendency of blaming previous governments 
for the loss of small islands, which were formerly part of Indonesia. For instance, 
users expressed their negative sentiments by saying, “the new president must be 
able to protect and maintain our national sovereignty and prevent the loss of 
more islands” (comment posted on June 22, 2014); “After the Sipadan and 
Ligitan case, the new president should pay more attention to our small islands” 
(comment posted on June 23, 2014).   
Apparently, many users placed the blame of the loss of two islands to 
Malaysia squarely onto former President Megawati Sukarnoputri’s administration. 
In reality, the two islands had been ownerless during the dispute which meant 
that, technically, Indonesia had never actually “lost” the islands. Nevertheless, for 
many Indonesians, the outcome of the dispute was a matter of national shame 
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(Butcher, 2013). Moreover, Malaysia, and previously the British government, had 
greater claims to the islands ranging from their economic use of the islands since 
early 1917 when the local Malaysians collected turtle eggs, to the more recent 
tourism industry on those islands. In contrast, the Indonesian government and its 
former colonizing power, the Netherlands, failed to provide proper evidence of 
authority, according to the International Court of Justice (Arsana, 2013; Butcher, 
2013). In this context, it can be concluded that when it comes to sovereignty, 
territory alone does not guarantee legitimacy; instead, legitimacy resides in the 
use that people make of a territory (Colson, 2003). The case illustrated two 
important lessons for the Indonesian government, namely, the importance of 
exercising national rights over the islands in a visible way, and the importance of 
understanding the meaning of the islands for national defense, political, and 
economic prosperity (Situmorang, 2012). Users’ comments about the importance 
of a strong candidate to preserve national claim over the islands illustrate this 
point.  
The ideal candidate was constructed as an emotional nexus of anti-
foreigner policies. Consistent with previous studies, the references to national 
identity can also manifest as a social defense mechanism in which feelings of 
shame about a nation’s weakness or its perceived negative reputation in the 
eyes of international powers are associated with feelings of anger against foreign 
powers (Vogler, 2000). Here, an emotion-infused user’s comments about foreign 
exploitation are illustrative of this point: “I hate foreign companies because they 
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are overly exploiting our natural resources from us” (comment posted on June 
23, 2014). Other users claimed to be “extremely saddened” by the existing 
condition. The metaphor of a leech draining its host of blood was also used to 
make this point: “we may be a big nation, but our national wealth will soon be 
gone consumed by those heartless foreign companies like Freeport. Big leeches 
are very dangerous to us. I just hate them” (comment posted on June 23, 2014).   
Users also showed emotion when expressing disapproval for the role of 
foreign aid on numerous occasions, especially those from Western countries: “It 
is 2014 and by now we should be able to stop relying on foreign aid because it is 
so degrading and does not bring significant change to us. Wake up bro! I feel so 
ashamed” (comment posted on June 23, 2014). Another user pointed out the 
negative side of foreign aid while proposing an alternative solution: “If we 
cultivate this high reliance on foreign aid, Indonesia will only remain as a poor 
country because our local government does not know what to do with the money. 
Instead, what we need more is foreign investment in different economic sectors” 
(comment posted on June 23, 2014). These instances show how the construction 
of national identity in relation to foreign powers is a complicated issue that 
involves strong emotions such as those of hate, anger, and shame (Vogler, 2000; 
Aspinall, 2016).  
Along with emotional expressions against international interference, users 
also made negative statements against colonial powers. The anti-colonial 
sentiment occurred in comments involving references to past colonialism during 
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the Dutch exploitation period. Many users believed national sovereignty to be 
threatened because they saw Indonesia was still in the process of being 
colonialized. Users, for instance, expressed their burden by stating, “If you think 
that we are free from colonialism then you are so wrong my friend. The Dutch 
may no longer occupy our nation, even so, we are still bombarded by the foreign 
exploitation. We should do something!” (comment posted on June 23, 2014); “We 
may have declared our independence in 1945, but in practice we are still in 
control of the super power nations. Is this what we want?” (comment posted on 
June 23, 2014). Although the anti-Dutch language is not apparent in the postings, 
users mentioned the struggle of national heroes during the Dutch colonial era 
and what it had done to the mentality of some Indonesians: “Our founding fathers 
and national heroes fought for us in order to be free from the Dutch. And they 
fought with tears and blood, so we must protect our national identity and heighten 
our sense of nationalism” (comment posted on June 23, 2014); “During the Dutch 
occupation, many of our national heroes sacrificed themselves for the sake of 
national liberty. Come on people! We should be brave and free ourselves from 
the hands of foreigners” (comment posted on June 23, 2014); “People! We 
should not let colonial mindsets, like the feeling of inferiority brings us down. 
Keep on fighting” (comment posted on June 23, 2014), and “We must always 
remember what our national heroes did for us for the sovereignty of our nation” 
(comment posted on June 23, 2014). One possible reason that can explain why 
many users are still impacted by Dutch colonialism is because the Dutch 
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occupation lasted for more than 300 years, and this attitude eventually became a 
distinctive feature of Indonesian nationalism (Aspinall, 2016). Thus, the 
construction of Indonesia’s national identity is strongly affected by history and 
often involves references to the years of struggle against colonial control. 
(Aspinall, 2016).  
The desire to be respected by other nations seemed to circle around the 
perceived intentions of Malaysia’s and Indonesia’s economic status. Users 
reported how the current level of Indonesia’s economic growth, which many 
believe to be lower than that of Malaysia, made them feel ashamed: “Indonesia 
arise, how come we are so behind Malaysia. Territorially-wise, we are larger than 
Malaysia and yet our GDP growth is lower than Malaysia. Come on people!” 
(comment posted on June 24, 2014); “It is shameful and cruel knowing that 
Malaysia is economically more advanced than Indonesia. We need a better 
leader!”(comment posted on June 24, 2014); “Arise Indonesia. We know we can 
be more prosperous than Malaysia!” (comment posted on June 24, 2014). For 
some, the tension was more directed to the problematic situation of Indonesian 
migrant workers in Malaysia, as they saw the government at fault for not 
providing standardized training for the migrant workers. One user stated that, “I 
feel so humiliated by the condition of our migrant workers. Many of them 
experience inhumane treatment while in Malaysia” (comment posted on June 24, 
2014). Meanwhile, one user expressed stronger language by stating, “I don’t 
want to be known as a slave country. Our migrant workers in Malaysia work as 
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maids and they receive no respect from their employers. We’re losing our face! 
We are not a nation of slaves. We have dignity and what we need is to gain 
respect from Malaysia” (comment posted on June 24, 2014).   
For some users, the most important issue of national dignity was restoring 
Indonesia to its previous status of “Asian Tiger,” thanks to its significant 
economic performance in the early 1990s (“The Report: Indonesia,” 2014). The 
considerable GDP growth that occurred from 1965 to 1995 decreased the 
national poverty rate which, for many experts, indicated a promising prospect to 
the overall economic stability in Indonesia (“The Report: Indonesia,” 2014). The 
expression of shame and dissatisfaction can be seen as another form of 
economic nationalism, which occurred as a result of comparisons between 
Indonesia’s past as the “Asian tiger economy” and its current economy, which, 
for some, is far removed from that status. Rather than advocating efforts to build 
the nation’s economy, users focused instead on the urgency of reviving 
Indonesia’s long lost economic status: “Indonesia will be a great tiger again in the 
future! No more shame people! (comment posted on June 25, 2014); “We need 
to resurrect the Asian tiger title back to our nation, I am Indonesia arise!” 
(comment posted on June 25, 2014). Others focused on the need to bring 
economic stability by reducing the number of exchange workers instead of 
concentrating on restoring Indonesia’s “Asian Tiger” status: “It is stupid if you ask 
the next leader to bring back the Asian tiger status when we still have 
tremendous amounts of exchange workers out there” (comment posted on June 
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25, 2014). Aside from that, it is interesting to note that several users added how 
Prabowo outweighed Jokowi’s capability in resurrecting the Asian tiger status 
because many believed that Prabowo’s leadership style and political program of 
reducing the number of migrant workers aligned with restoring Indonesia’s 
economic dominance.  
The relationship between national and foreign interests was, in the users’ 
view, an important point that distinguished the two candidates. Users constructed 
Prabowo as more capable of limiting or even eliminating foreign intervention 
because he was perceived to have more passion and to encourage nationalism 
among the public. Accordingly, users repeatedly motivated Prabowo to fight 
foreign control over Indonesia’s national assets to achieve ultimate freedom, as 
well as to maintain the unity of the nation as a whole. On the contrary, users 
expressed doubts towards Jokowi’s capability in restricting foreign interference 
by highlighting his perceived weakness in taking a stand against foreign 
intervention; an approach often regarded by users as a major disadvantage to his 
overall political strategy. Users went as far as to define Jokowi as a political pawn 
of foreign countries, one willing to put other countries’ interests above the 
national well-being. 
As noticed by scholars and experts, most Indonesian presidential 
candidates tend to incorporate and promote a nationalist platform in their 
campaign; Prabowo and Jokowi were no exception. However, Prabowo 
repeatedly endorsed nationalist messages, especially those against foreign 
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intervention and promoting national dignity (Aspinall, 2016). Thus, we see the 
campaign conducted by Prabowo, which portrayed him as a defender of national 
interests, reflected in how users constructed Prabowo himself. Often, Prabowo 
focused on the issue of foreign exploitation of Indonesia’s natural resources and 
the position of Indonesian subservience and slavery to foreign powers. One way 
to break the cycle, according to Prabowo, was to restore Indonesian greatness 
by restricting foreign involvement in local economic sectors (Aspinall). Jokowi, on 
the other hand, encouraged nationalism without excessive measures and used 
more moderate language. For Jokowi, negotiation seemed to be the preferred 
solution in transnational disputes, especially in the ones between Indonesia and 
Malaysia; as a result, users saw him as the weaker of the two. 
This fundamental difference between how the two candidates were 
perceived by users in relation to national identity is evident in how users 
employed metaphors to describe the two candidates. Users referred to Prabowo 
as the “Asian Tiger,” a reference meant to indicate Prabowo’s charismatic 
character that would benefit Indonesia in recovering the status of Asia’s Tiger in 
regards to economic development. For instance, one user commented, “Prabowo 
is a charismatic leader and he deserves to be called the tiger of Asia. Jokowi is 
so far away from this title” (comment made on June 28, 2014). This metaphor 
was often repeated on billboards as the election approached, with a picture of 
Prabowo placed beside the Asian Tiger slogan (Aspinall, 2015). Prabowo’s own 
oratory style and presentation embraced the slogan. For example, in a speech 
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that Prabowo delivered during an event for his political party known as Gerindra 
(Great Indonesia Movement Party), the candidate used the metaphor of the 
Asian Tiger to explain his political agenda and intention and to highlight how he 
would be able to restore Indonesia’s economic status. Prabowo’s speeches were 
typically delivered in a theatrical style combined with a military spirit and a 
passionate linguistic performance to show his great enthusiasm, all to “invoke the 
grandeur and passion of Indonesia’s nationalist political tradition” (Aspinall, 2015, 
p. 13). Thus, the use of the Asian Tiger metaphor in users’ comments was both a 
reflection of how the social media environment and the official campaign 
message aligned, and a way for Prabowo to forge an emotional connection to the 
audience by making national identity a central theme in his political program. 
Indeed, it appeared that Prabowo explicitly introduced the tiger metaphor in his 
Facebook page long before the official campaign period to demonstrate which 
kind of leadership style people in Indonesia needed to elevate the nation 
(Aspinall, 2015). Thus, the metaphor of the Asian Tiger played a strategic role in 
the construction of this candidate’s image by also creating a contrast with the 
allegedly weaker character of his opponent.  
Metaphors can serve to build an emotional response in the voters during a 
political speech (Kuo, 2003; Tannen, 1989). The utilization of animal metaphors 
in political discourses can also be found in Taiwan, where Taiwanese politicians 
used metaphors as a strategy to undermine opponents and as a political tool to 
maintain positive self-face in the public eyes of the other (Kuo, 2003). Animal 
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metaphors such as “little white rabbit”, “rooster”, and “fox” during a live debate 
can either make or break a candidate’s image (Kuo, 2003). In Prabowo’s case, 
the metaphor of “Asian Tiger,” played on nationalistic fears of foreign economic 
invasion, shaped his positive image as a strong leader.  
Candidate Image and Group Identity 
So far, the analysis demonstrated how users appropriated nationalistic 
discourse to create an idealized image of a political candidate able to restore the 
economic and political independence of Indonesia and to project that image on 
Prabowo. The contrast between “us” versus “them” on which nationalistic 
discourse was articulated is also present in how users distinguished “their” 
candidate, Prabowo, from the opposing candidate, Jakowi. In this respect, 
Prabowo’s supporters used the constructed image of their candidate to create a 
contrast between themselves as a group and Jakowi’s supporters.  
The construction of candidate image through the “us” vs. “them” contrast, 
between the group of supporters, rested on two important elements: the symbols 
mobilized to construct the group identity of the supporters, and inferences based 
on which public figure supported whom.  
First, each group of supporters expressed collective identity by showing 
different behaviors or practices that served as signifiers which connected the 
group around a shared symbol, thus distinguishing it from the other (Soon & 
Kluver, 2014; Van Summeren, 2007), as evidenced in the contrast between the 
“one finger salute” and “two finger salute.” The formation of these symbolic hand 
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gestures had to do with the number displayed on the ballot paper. The “one 
finger salute” that Prabowo supporters often displayed during the election 
campaign was communicated in online settings to remind Prabowo supporters of 
what connected them. For example, in one posting, users stated, “One finger 
salute for you Prabowo” (comment posted on June 26, 2014); “Once one finger 
will always be one finger” (comment posted on June 26, 2014). On the other 
hand, Jokowi’s supporters showed their group identity with the hand gesture of a 
“two fingers salute.” They asserted their collective identity by uttering, “Two finger 
salute for Jokowi” (comment posted on June 26, 2014); “Two fingers salute until 
the end” (comment posted on June 26, 2014). In practice, Jokowi’s supporters, 
especially those celebrities who supported him, extended the two finger salute by 
using it as a theme for a musical concert to gain more social capital just one 
week before the election took place (Dewi, 2014). These salutes also appeared 
in various memes and in the selfies that the voting public posted on various 
social media platforms. 
Thus, these non-verbal gestures were used to tie a candidate’s image to 
the collective identity of the supporters. As explained by Goffman (1973), the 
non-verbal symbolic gesture, which refers to “tie signs,” can be an effective tool 
to signify relationships or ties between people and involves “objects, acts, 
expression, and only excluding the literal aspects of explicit documentary 
statements” (p. 194). Though Goffman (1973) emphasizes the role of “tie signs” 
as expressions of intimacy in the realm of personal relationships, they are 
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relevant in politics as indicators of a symbolic relationships, very much like dress 
codes (O’Brien, 2006).  Here, the “tie signs” were specifically used in social 
media postings to assess the other’s in-group or out-group status. 
Besides using verbal or non-verbal gestures, the acknowledgement of 
group identity can also be expressed through material objects, such as flags, 
emblems, logos, guide books for the backpacker subculture, or even national 
identity cards in Indonesia (Callahan & Ledgerwood, 2016; Currie, Campbell-
Trant, & Seaton, 2005; O'Shaughnessy, 2009). These symbolic objects do not 
function merely as ornamental features, but they also allow the development of 
group cohesiveness, competency, realness, and more importantly, the 
construction of collective identity within the members of the group (Callahan & 
Ledgerwood, 2016). 
A second strategy used to construct a candidate’s image was to project 
the image of the public figures who endorsed the candidate onto the image of the 
candidate and his supporters. For example, one user stated: “As a supporter of 
Prabowo, I have never spread false comments about anything including Jokowi, 
because I believe that it is not right and will only create chaos between 
supporters. However, Jokowi supporters like to write negative comments about 
Prabowo and most are not accurate. Please go away, you are not part of this 
group and I will not ever associate with any of you” (comment posted on June 26, 
2014).   
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The perception of Jokowi as a political “puppet” manipulated by the party 
leader Megawati, was the central signifier through which Prabowo’s supporters 
distinguished themselves from Jokowi’s. As Chairwomen of his party, many 
people perceived Megawati, the public figure endorsing Jokowi, as the source of 
power who was in control of Jokowi’s decisions and political moves. Megawati is 
the daughter of the first president of Indonesia, Sukarno, who is also one of the 
founding fathers of the nation. In her relatively short political career, Megawati 
became Indonesia’s president in 2001 by replacing the impeached President 
Abdurrahman Wahid (popularly known as Gus Dur). In the public’s eyes, 
including political observers, many recognized Megawati’s political decisions as 
rather slow, especially when it came to implementing important policies and 
when dealing with ongoing internal conflict such as in the city of Ambon, the 
capital city of Maluku (Azra, 2006). Although endorsed by her party to enter the 
presidential race, Jokowi was more popular and eventually became the official 
candidate. Accordingly, many analysts portrayed her as being more satisfied to 
manipulate politics behind the curtains (“Indonesia Presidential Front-Runner,” 
2014). This perception was further consolidated as a result of a political speech 
in which Megawati asked Jokowi to serve his political party as the product of that 
party (Rachman & Otto, 2015). The opposing candidate, Prabowo, took full 
advantage of the comment and construed it to mean that Jokowi was Megawati’s 
puppet. Prabowo warned his supporters against the danger of electing a “puppet” 
president (“Indonesia Presidential Front-Runner,” 2014). This is yet another 
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example of how social media users adopted the official imagery of the political 
campaign in their comments. 
The puppet as metaphor in political settings was widely used by the 
bourgeois political writers in the Renaissance era to great effect and persists to 
the present day (Shershow, 1995). For some, the puppet was a metaphor 
encouraging parody against the political suppression of the status quo, while for 
other writers, it was a metaphor indicative of the need for moral education. In the 
Indonesian political context, the image of the political puppet was used to 
emphasize the perceived weakness of Jokowi as a viable political candidate, 
someone whose political independence was in question. For instance, in a 
comment made on June 30, 2014, one user stated, “I choose Prabowo over 
Jokowi because I don’t want to be ruled by a puppet president.” Another 
commenter expressed a similar tone, “I give pity for people who support Jokowi 
knowing that he is a puppet of Megawati. This is a very dangerous situation” 
(comment posted on June, 30, 2014). Additionally, others held the belief that 
Jokowi had to follow Megawati’s “commands” as the main political power in the 
party. 
Prabowo’s supporters embraced the “political puppet” metaphor in their 
online postings and used it as a sort of “call to arms” to denigrate the opponent’s 
supporters. One user asserted that, “It is so sad to see many of Jokowi’s 
supporters become the supporters of a puppet candidate. Open your eyes man! 
Well I am glad I am not part of your group.” In this context, Prabowo’s supporters 
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believed they were collectively “intelligent” to side with Prabowo. For instance, a 
user reported, “Smart people choose Prabowo. And this my friend clearly does 
not exist in Jokowi’s team and supporters. We are on the right track!” (comment 
posted on June 30, 2014). Of course, the intelligence that Prabowo’s supporters 
allegedly displayed was denied by their opponents. Several users, for example, 
felt that Jokowi supporters were “unintelligent” because they often criticized and 
belittled Prabowo, using a language perceived to be “uneducated” and offensive. 
This result aligns with the previous studies that demonstrate how individuals 
have the tendency to boost their similarities with the internalized social group (or 
in-group), while establishing sharp differences with the members of the out-group 
(David & Turner, 1999; Hoffner & Rehkoff, 2011). The above signifiers are used 
in a process of comparison between who the users believe they are and who the 
users believe they are not. In other words, there was a process of evaluation 
between the “self-recognition and external recognition” (Soon & Kluver, 2014, p. 
507).  
In contrast, Jokowi supporters were more likely to distinguish themselves 
from the perceived qualities of the artists who endorsed Prabowo and linking 
those qualities to Prabowo’s supporters. One of the users uttered, “Ahmad Dhani 
[the artist] is politically unknowledgeable and poorly educated. So no wonder this 
resonates perfectly with Prabowo’s supporters who more or less are the same” 
(comment posted on June 30, 2014). It is worth mentioning here that celebrity 
endorsement of political candidates was at its peak in 2014, during the 
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presidential campaign. Celebrities consisting of film stars, comedians, creative 
workers, soap-opera artists, and mostly high profile musicians endorsed both 
Jokowi and Prabowo in various ways, such as through the creation of campaign 
songs and encouragement videos circulated on Youtube. One notable form of 
celebrity endorsement on Jokowi’s side was the free musical concert involving 
hundreds of local musicians, titled “Salam Dunia Jari Concert: Road to Victory” 
(The two-finger salute) and held just seven days before the election day on July 
9, 2014 (Dewi, 2014). During a press conference at Jokowi’s campaign media 
center, Abdee, one of the musicians involved, stated that the event was not 
solicited by Jokowi’s political team and that every artist in the concert was 
performing pro-bono (Dewi, 2014). 
As shown in the existing literature, celebrity endorsement is prevalent in 
Western democracies, particularly in American politics (Jackson & Darrow, 2005; 
Wheeler, 2013). The involvement of celebrities in Indonesia was apparent in 
2014. Indonesian celebrities have become openly outspoken and proud about 
their political standpoint, especially in supporting their chosen candidate in the 
2014 presidential election. Throughout the official campaign period, local 
musicians and film stars were involved in political advertisements, musical 
concerts, and social media as a way to catapult their candidate’s electability 
before the election day. The rise of celebrity political endorsement has never 
been as prominent as in the 2014 presidential election; Indonesia only adopted 
direct election in 2004 (Fukuoka & Thalang, 2014).  
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To a certain extent, celebrity endorsements towards political candidates 
are triggered because of the already solidified figure of the candidate himself or 
herself. In Bill Clinton’s case, for instance, celebrities were attracted to him 
because he was perceived to have strong charisma, intellectuality, and a strong 
vision about the environment, multiculturalism, and gay rights (Wheeler, 2013). 
Most significantly, Clinton courted the involvement of Hollywood superstars 
which, in turn, made them feel special (Wheeler, 2013). Therefore, it can be 
concluded that the linkage between celebrities and politicians is “a two-way 
street” (Wheeler, 2013, p. 42). Similarly, in Prabowo’s case, many of celebrities 
who endorsed him did so because of his already established charisma as a 
political candidate and image as a strong, decisive leader. In contrast, other 
celebrities were attracted to Jokowi because of his perceived image as an 
approachable, down to earth, and humble person. 
However, it is worth remembering that celebrities use their social capital to 
attract followers for a candidate, thus modifying the candidate’s image. For 
example, in Obama’s case, the use of celebrities in his campaign was not only a 
means to improve his public persona as a presidential candidate, but also as a 
strategy to mobilize African-American voters (Wheeler, 2013). Obama used 
endorsement—for instance, the endorsement of high-profile celebrities like 
Oprah Winfrey—to gather a wider range of constituents. As reported by 
Garthwaite and Moore (2008), “Winfrey’s endorsement of Obama was estimated 
to bring in 1,015,559 votes” (as cited in Wheeler, 2013, p. 80). Interestingly, the 
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association between Hollywood and Obama did not always work harmoniously, 
as illustrated in his 2012 presidential campaign when the legendary actor and 
director Clint Eastwood symbolically addressed Obama by speaking to an empty 
chair at the Republican National Convention (Abdullah, 2012; Wheeler, 2013). 
Thus, the relationship with celebrities can often be negative and used as a form 
of political attack (Wheeler, 2013).  
In the case under analysis, the perceived failures of the media celebrities 
who endorsed Prabowo were seen to reflect on Prabowo himself. Several Jokowi 
supporters made remarks about the artists’ outfits which seemed to remind them 
of some of the Nazi uniforms. One user stated, “I am totally against the human 
rights violence committed by the Nazis. That being said, I am against Ahmad 
Dhani and the person he supports” (comment posted on June 23, 2014). The 
Nazi-like elements in Dhani’s costume received a lot of attention from voters. As 
mentioned by one of the users, “I can’t believe Ahmad Dhani wears a Nazi officer 
uniform? And use it during the time when he is endorsing a presidential 
candidate. I think he is losing his mind” (comment posted on June 23, 2014). 
Another user agreed with this comment by saying, “I think Ahmad Dhani is crazy 
and on top of that he is stupid. He should have known better the historical 
meaning behind the uniform” (comment posted on June 23, 2014).  
The issue of Ahmad Dhani’s Nazi-style uniform did attract international 
and domestic critical attention. Time (2014) for instance, reported negatively on 
Dhani’s costume), which many believe explains the negative outcome of 
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Prabowo’s campaign (Kwok, 2014). Others assumed that Ahmad Dhani did not 
politically comprehend the historical background surrounding the Nazi Party, and 
only used Nazi elements as an artistic statement (“Sejarawan Kritisi Kostum,” 
2014). Regardless of the intent behind the artist’s outfit, Jokowi’s supporters 
cashed in on the similarity to a Nazi uniform to emphasize how Prabowo and his 
supporters endorsed violence: “We support a peaceful campaign and leave alone 
the violent behavior. We are not those people who support Prabowo who are 
often involved in anarchy efforts” (comment posted on June 23, 2014). Ahmad 
Dhani himself claimed that his musical expressions were misunderstood; 
however, fellow musicians like Anggun and Glen Fredly disagreed and tweeted 
that such manners were ignorant. They also commented that Indonesia must not 
fall into the hands of fascists (“Ahmad Dhani’s Nazi”, 2014), which further 
cemented the link between the perceived image of an endorsing celebrity and the 
image of the candidate himself; as evidenced in the following: “I think it is 
careless for Ahmad Dhani to use the fascist-style costume because it may bring 
negative perceptions to Prabowo’s overall image as a potential leader” (comment 
posted on June 25, 2014). 
Jokowi’s supporters also expressed criticism towards the artistic qualities 
of the song itself. For example, one user stated, “I don’t like the song, and as a 
suggestion, it would have been better if those singers did not copy Queen’s song, 
We Will Rock You. It doesn’t sound original” (comment posted on June 22, 
2014). Another user said, “How come those celebrities plagiarized someone’s 
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else song without asking permission first?” (comment posted on June 22, 2014). 
It appeared that many of the users agreed on the issue of alleged plagiarism of 
those celebrities, especially targeted towards Ahmad Dhani since he was the 
initiator of the campaign song. As expressed by the users, “Yeah Ahmad Dhani 
terribly plagiarized Queen’s song and I thought he was a gifted musician?” 
(comment posted on June 22, 2014); “How come a musician as cool as Ahmad 
Dhani created a campaign song from an existing song and I can feel a degree of 
plagiarism in this song. In fact, it is a high one” (comment posted on June 22, 
2014).  
Jokowi’s supporters, naturally, acknowledged the artistic quality of the 
celebrities who supported Jokowi. For example, “Honestly, I think celebrities who 
support Jokowi have better taste in music and clearly are more creative than 
Ahmad Dhani and friends” (comment posted on June 22, 2014). In a similar vein, 
another user wrote, “Yeah Jokowi’s celebrities are far more creative and they 
sound very organic unlike Ahmad Dhani who plagiarized Queen’s song” 
(comment posted on June 23, 2014).  
In summary, the construction of the political images of the two candidates 
was directly connected to how the candidate’s relationship with important public 
figures was perceived by the public. The relationship between Prabowo and the 
endorsing media artist Ahmad Dhani, on one hand, and the relationship between 
Jokowi and his endorsing media artists, as well as the endorsing political leader 
Megawati, were strategies that voters employed to build the image of their 
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candidate and his opponent; as well as the image of the two groups of 
supporters. Other public figures who endorsed the two candidates were also 
used to distinguish between the positive and negative qualities of the candidates 
and their supporters. 
The Construction of Candidate Image Based on Personal Traits 
One substantial aspect that can explain why people like one candidate 
and dislike another is the extent to which they can identify personally with them 
(Brooks, Manza, & Bolzendalh, 2003; Levine, 2005). This statement is not only 
true for politics. In the sports world, sport fans are more likely to identify and 
connect with athletes who seem to share similarity of character, lifestyle, and 
political opinions with the fans. For instance, old school athletes have a better 
connection with audiences who are oriented towards old school ideology than 
with younger fans (below the age of 30) who are accustomed to a materialist set 
of values (Sukhdial, Aiken, & Kahle, 2002).  
Similarly, in the case under analysis, voters connected to the candidates 
on a personal basis using perceived character traits that, in their opinion, made 
them similar to the candidates. Users believed Prabowo had the quality of a 
sincere person, or to be exact, as a non-hypocritical individual. One post stated, 
for example, “I like Prabowo because he is not a hypocrite when dealing with his 
contender and I myself am personally similar to this” (comment posted on June 
28, 2014). Another post stated, “The thing that moves me is the fact that 
Prabowo always says his true feelings and never sugar-coated his opinions, and 
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I am like that as a person” (comment posted on June 28, 2014). It is likely that 
this inference about Prabowo’s character had to do with how aligned people 
perceived Prabowo’s relationship with journalists, to be with his own. Thus, 
Prabowo never tried to satisfy the media or court them for the sake of his public 
image, which was perceived by some to be in line with his character. For 
example, at a news conference at the Freedom Institute in Jakarta, Prabowo 
refused to answer a Jakarta Post’s reporter and criticized the media for giving 
him disproportionately negative treatment (“Ini Alasan Prabowo”, 2014), an 
attitude perceived to be in line with his uncompromising character.   
Other positive personal traits that users remarked on were Prabowo’s 
qualities as an animal enthusiast and how that connected to the passion of his 
voters. For example, several users mentioned how they were very fond of 
Prabowo’s animal-lover side, such as his care for his horses and the goats he 
bred.  A user stated “I love animals and so does Prabowo. This is great and I 
think a leader who loves animals would be a responsible one” (comment posted 
on June 27, 2014). Prabowo’s passion towards his horse and his horseback 
riding skills were introduced to the pubic eyes during a campaign event that 
further cemented the military image of Prabowo (Aritonang, 2014). Various online 
media outlets who interviewed Prabowo also commented on Prabowo’s animal-
friendly home, often described as an environment filled with dozens of horses, 
and used a photograph of Prabowo with his exotic pet eagle (“Prabowo: What 
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Guarantees”, 2013). Prabowo’s interaction with animals was also a background 
image in a widely shared video interview on YouTube. 
Jokowi, too, was praised for his efforts in handling animal abuse in 
Jakarta. As an example, a resident of Jakarta mentioned online:  
As a mother of two I do not want my child to see chained macaques being 
exploited badly as a form of entertainment. I put high value on animals 
and thank God Jokowi also has the same attitude by eradicating the 
monkey business (comment posted on June 28, 2014).  
Another comment made by a student was: 
As a veterinarian student and someone who is opposed to animal 
exploitation, improper monkey shows should be banned because it is 
inhumane and their health is at high risk. I believe animal’s health is 
essential. And I give credit to Jokowi for stopping the business and being 
aware of the macaque’s health” (comment posted on June 28, 2014).  
The issue of monkey performances without proper treatment from the handlers 
has been a serious situation at the heart of Jakarta for many years. However, 
Jokowi was the first bureaucrat who openly criticized the abusive monkey shows 
and took a real initiative to stop the action (Kapoor & Fabi, 2013). Furthermore, 
political analysts noted how these efforts, while on a relatively small scale, often 
brought unexpected political benefits because they were perceived by voters as 
an improvement compared to the neglect of other government officials (Kapoor & 
Fabi, 2013).  
81 
 
Another inference that enabled voters to connect to the candidate had to 
do with religion. For Prabowo, users felt that he was a good Islamic leader who 
would protect Islam in Indonesia. As one user expressed it, “I see Prabowo as a 
person with a sincere heart and that he would be committed to Islam. I see this in 
me as a young Muslim” (comment posted on June 30, 2014). Another user 
remarked on how Prabowo would defend Islamic and Muslim communities in 
Indonesia. Conversely, with Jokowi, some users were not sure about his religion 
and what being a Muslim meant to him, even though Jokowi described himself to 
the media as a devout Muslim. With a doubting tone, a user commented, “It is 
hard for me to connect with Jokowi because though he is a Muslim, some of his 
actions do not show enough that he is a devout one” (comment posted on June 
30, 2014). This comment may have been due to the political rumors spread on 
social media about Jokowi’s wife only using the hijab as an accessory, to appeal 
to potential voters during the campaign. As shown from previous studies, there is 
a correlation between voters’ religion and presidential candidate preference 
(Bradberry, 2016). Religious service attendance by presidential candidates 
during primaries is a significant predictor of voter choice. Although the present 
analysis does not focus on the relationship between religion and voter choice in 
Indonesia, it is worth mentioning that the devoutness to religion for the voters 
was an important thread throughout many user postings.  
However, more interesting than the perceived character traits that users 
employed to form a personal connection to the candidate were these traits that 
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voters perceived as being part of a candidate’s personality. The analysis of 
postings revealed that users constructed the image of the candidate by invoking 
the candidate’s alleged character in the context of the candidate’s political past, 
the treatment at the hands of other people, and the quality of the candidate’s 
spiritual life. These linkages were used to make predictions about the state of the 
country under a candidate and thus to distinguish among the two candidates.  
Political Scandal and The Candidate’s Character 
References to political scandals were important strategies for constructing 
the candidates’ image. The occurrence of political rumors referencing political 
scandals was significant in the 2014 presidential election, especially in the online 
sphere. Through the extensive use of social media, rumors are both a way for 
information to flow to the public and a strategic form of political attack (Weeks & 
Garrett, 2014). Flourishing rumors that consisted of either positive or negative 
statements are often related to a candidate’s credibility, party, personal life, and 
the people who are involved in the candidate’s success team. In the dynamic of 
online discussions, voters are more attracted to negative rumors that apply to the 
candidates.  
Online users used political scandal as a way of making inferences about 
the character of the candidates. Jokowi’s supporters referred to Prabowo’s 
alleged human rights scandal as the reason why they would not choose him. 
Thus, Prabowo was seen as the main figure behind the May 1998 riot. Jokowi’s 
supporters expressed curiosity and even outrage at the fact that Prabowo was 
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still supported, given his alleged human rights violations.  For example, one user 
stated: “How come Prabowo gets so much support when we know he is abusing 
Indonesian human rights” (comment posted on June 25, 2014). In a similar vein, 
another user commented: “I wonder what makes people vote for Prabowo when I 
know for sure that the May riot was under his command” (comment posted on 
June 26, 2014). “Prabowo will not become our president because I believe many 
people would not approve it since he is blacklisted by the United States 
government for his human rights abuse scandal” (comment posted on June 26, 
2014).  
Prabowo was indeed denied entrance to the United States in 2000 due to 
accusations of his involvement in the kidnapping case involving activists who 
were against Suharto’s regime in 1998 (Hiebert, Osius, & Polling, 2013). 
Nonetheless, experts explained that the U.S. government may grant a visa for 
Prabowo since the allegation could not be entirely proven until clear and 
sufficient evidence existed as a result of a proper court trial (Hiebert, Osius, & 
Polling, 2013). These negative comments regarding Prabowo’s past political 
scandals confirms research that shows how voters respond more to allegations 
of political scandal, especially those related to corruption and power abuse 
(Basinger, 2013).       
Prabowo has denied his involvement in the May 1998 riot and added that 
the horror was a political plot targeted to attack his position as a commander 
(Camilleri & Schottman, 2013). On the other hand, he has a different attitude 
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when dealing with the kidnapping incident, asserting that he was only following 
orders from the leader above him who had more power to govern, and therefore, 
by default, he was not entirely responsible for the impact (Camilleri & Schottman, 
2013). However, a more recent information from the military inquiry indicated that 
Prabowo failed to translate the meanings behind the order, and thus, made him 
responsible for the kidnapping case (Bachelard, 2014)  Interestingly, one user 
defended Prabowo’s position by stating, “As a person who abides by the law, I 
think it is so unfair if we judge Prabowo without having definite evidence for his 
role in the kidnaping and torture the young activist back in the 1998 riot” 
(comment posted on June 25, 2014). In addition, one user seemed to agree with 
the fact that Prabowo was simply following a command from the top leaders with 
more authority and power, which indicated that he was not the sole perpetrator of 
the May riot. This can be seen from the statement, “Prabowo was only a pawn, 
there were leaders who instructed him to kidnap activists who were anti-Suharto. 
And those leaders must also take responsibility for the horrific events they 
caused these innocent people” (comment posted on the June 28, 2014).  
Another interesting finding was how some users expressed their 
assumptions that the large support of Prabowo was due to the political party 
factor. For example, “I think people who support Prabowo, regardless of his 
political past behavior or allegations, do so because of his political party” 
(comment posted on June 25, 2014). Similarly, other users stated that citizens 
who became Prabowo’s supporters were those who came from the same party 
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as him. This is shown from comments like, “I bet people who are the members of 
the Gerindra party are those who support Prabowo and shut their eyes regarding 
the kidnapping accusation” (comment posted on June 23, 2014). “Yeah those 
who also belong to Gerindra must ignore the fact that Prabowo was once 
involved in the human rights abuse scandal” (comment posted on June 23, 
2014). These results supported past research related to the Clinton-Lewinsky 
political scandal in 1998, showing that voters held the same position by 
endorsing the party of Clinton (or the status quo), regardless of the sexual 
scandal behind him (Jacobson, 1999). One aspect that explains this result was 
that Clinton’s administration made a good contribution to the economy, which 
improved public welfare and decreased level of crime (Jacobson). Although 
Prabowo’s case was not related to a sexual issue, many individuals may have 
believed that his plan regarding economic development could improve the overall 
economic situation in Indonesia. As mentioned by Jacobson, among the 
indicators that American citizens used to evaluate the president’s performance, 
the economy’s performance is highly regarded and should be implemented 
properly by the president (Jacobson). This can be shown by several statements 
like, “I know that Prabowo is not perfect considering his allegation of human 
rights abuse, but his economic agenda which focuses on improving the 
agricultural sector impressed me” (comment posted on June 22, 2014). “Prabowo 
may have a skeleton in his closet, but hey who does not right? What is more 
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important is we need his vision for reducing poverty” (comment posted on June 
23, 2014).   
On Jokowi’s side, users were more likely to point out his outward 
appearance as a mere tool in shaping a strategic public image, which many 
considered was misleading and full of hidden messages. For example, a user 
stated, “Jokowi may look ordinary and he does not indulge in expensive 
materials, but I don’t think it is a legit move. I bet he only uses it to gain public 
approval, especially from the grassroots” (comments posted on June 22, 2014). 
In a similar vein, another user stated, “with using simple attire, Jokowi may look 
approachable and nonchalant. However, these are only used to manipulate his 
public image since he needed to get public approval” (comment posted on June 
25, 2014). Furthermore, users also recognized Jokowi’s facial features as a thing 
that explained his character. This can be seen from a statement like, “with his 
baby-faced looks, Jokowi appears weak and vulnerable. I think this is what 
makes him so submissive to Megawati” (comment posted on June 22, 2014). 
Though, in real life, Jokowi does not entirely match baby-faced features, such as 
big eyes and a small chin. However, past research revealed that adults with 
baby-faced attributes are perceived to look more submissive and physically less 
strong than other adults (Berry & McArthur, 1985; Rosenberg, Khan, & Tran, 
1991). Moreover, there were also many users who made negative comments 
involving Jokowi’s physical features, particularly his slim posture. As an example, 
“How come you believe Jokowi? He is so skinny and malnourished looking. This 
87 
 
is not the kind of president that I want to have” (comment made on June 22, 
2014). “Why is Jokowi so skinny? He looks unhealthy with that kind of weight. I 
believe he has a problem with his body in general” (comment made on June 24, 
2014). This situation indicated that the physical characteristics of a leader or 
potential leader does matter to individuals. As seen in past research, there was a 
connection between a leader’s physical stature and preference for leaders 
(Murray, 2014). More specifically, people were more likely to choose a leader 
with greater weight and body mass index (BMI), especially in situations where 
threats were present (Murray, 2014), i.e., leaders who are physically more 
powerful, regardless of their degrees of attractiveness.   
Besides commenting on Jokowi’s physical attributes, users also discussed 
how Jokowi was supported by the “invisible conglomerate” who operates similar 
to the mafia. Users assumed that Jokowi’s campaign was financially supported 
with illegal money coming from these hidden conglomerates in exchange for 
something valuable. One user mentioned, “Open your eyes, don’t you know that 
Jokowi is supported by the “bad conglomerates”? Their invisible hands penetrate 
through Jokowi’s campaign. And I am sure they want something in return” 
(comment posted on June 26, 2014). Various users approved this comment and 
added statements like, “I agree with this comment. And what is more I think is 
that those ‘bad conglomerates’ would greatly monopolize important economic 
factors” (comment posted on June 26, 2014). Furthermore, many users also 
mentioned how they learned about this sensitive issue from Twitter. For example, 
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“Don’t you hear that people on Twitter are stating that Jokowi is backed up by the 
mafia?” He is so bad and definitely not the kind of leader that I want” (comment 
posted on June 26, 2014).  
One possible reason for this allegation can be traced from the occurrence 
of tabloid newspapers, namely Obor Rakyat (The People’s Torch). At a glance, 
readers may get an impression that the main theme of the tabloid contains 
various negative issues and distrust over Jokowi’s campaign, which many people 
consider aggressive and fueled with hate. In one of the articles, writers of the 
Obor Rakyat reported that Jokowi’s campaign was supported by the big Chinese 
conglomerate, which is popularly referred to as “cukong.” This may have 
happened because many of Jokowi’s supporters in Solo reported that the 
influential Chinese-Indonesians entrepreneurs were financially supporting his 
campaign in Solo, with a degree of reciprocation in return (Tyson & Purnomo, 
2014). Moreover, if we traced back these connections, Megawati also has a good 
relationship with notable Chinese-Indonesian conglomerates such as Lim Sioe 
Liong. It is important to note that in the context of the political realm in Indonesia, 
there has always been a degree of relationship between Indonesian politicians 
and the cukongs, suggesting that the relationship is one of the driving forces 
behind a campaign (Tyson & Purnomo, 2014). In addition, some users who 
discussed this allegation further added how Jokowi is allegedly supporting 
Christianization, proposing that he is a “bad Muslim.” For example, “Haven’t you 
heard that one of the main supporters of Jokowi’s campaign is the big business 
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man with Christianity background?” (comment posted on June 28, 2014). 
Moreover, another user commented, “It is not strange how Jokowi supports 
proliferation of Christianity in Solo, because he is close to many rich Chinese-
Indonesian businessman” (comment posted on June 29, 2014). Jokowi is indeed 
close to many successful Chinese-Indonesians and it is publicly known that these 
figures contributed significantly to supporting Jokowi’s campaign. This situation 
was later manipulated by Obor Rakyat by spreading a rumor that Jokowi’s father, 
who is known as Widjiatno Notomihardjo, “is actually a Chinese-Indonesian 
businessman with the name “Oey Hong Liong”, but changed his Chinese name 
for political reasons” (Tyson & Purnomo, 2014, p. 133).  
Moving on to the next allegation, users also talked about Jokowi’s sexual 
scandal, which many users claimed occurred when he was in China. For 
example, one user commented that Jokowi had a sex tape with a Chinese 
woman during a trip to China. Various users stigmatized Jokowi as a nasty old 
man: “Jokowi is a dirty old man, apparently” (comment posted on June 26, 2014). 
“Don’t you know that he has a sex tape with a Chinese woman. This is so 
disgusting. How come at the time of the election we heard about this immoral 
story?” (comment posted on June 27, 2014). Similar to the previous allegation, 
users obtained the sex scandal issue from a topic posted on Twitter and they 
inferred this in their comments. Though the number of reports are relatively 
small, the fact that users discussed the allegation showed that moral code is 
important for some people, especially during election time. Interestingly, some 
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users who discussed this matter speculated on the outcome if the allegation was 
indeed true even though they knew the possibility was relatively small since there 
was no actual sex tape circulated on the Internet or elsewhere. In essence, a sex 
scandal can be a parameter used by society in determining sexual moralities for 
the purpose of distinguishing between what is sexually acceptable and not 
(Gamson, 2001). In doing so, society may employ public humiliation as a form of 
punishment, which may result in a loss of status for the carrier of the scandal. 
Nevertheless, sociologically, a sexual scandal can be considered a phenomenon 
that is dependent on the time period where the sex scandal itself occurs 
(Gamson). Therefore, what is perceived by people as immoral behavior or 
something that should be kept private in one period of time, may not be the same 
later or even earlier in public (Gamson, 2001, p. 190).      
At the Hands of Other People 
Another important strategy for the construction of a candidate’s image was 
not what the candidate did himself, but what other people did to the candidate. 
As mentioned above, Prabowo was perceived as someone significantly involved 
in the May 1998 riots. Nevertheless, there is a controversy whether Prabowo’s 
involvement happened because Prabowo wanted it or because his senior 
generals ordered him to, which would have made Prabowo not entirely 
accountable for the riots. This political speculation was used to highlight 
Prabowo’s good character. For instance, “It is proven that Prabowo’s senior 
generals sacrificed Prabowo to hold the responsibility of shooting and killing in 
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the May 1998 riots. Those generals manipulated the case as if Prabowo was the 
person to blame. Prabowo was heavily afflicted by those generals during the 
political turmoil period” (comment posted on June 28, 2014). In a similar vein, a 
user explained: 
Why do we have to bring something that already occurred in the past. We 
cannot change the time. Move on guys! And most importantly, Prabowo’s 
superiors are the ones who needs to bear the responsibility for the May 
riots not Prabowo (comment posted on June 28, 2014).  
Another user stated: 
If you want to know who is responsible for the riots in Jakarta then you 
should ask Prabowo’s seniors during that time. Also, try to ask yourself if 
you were in Prabowo’s position at that time, what would you do to handle 
the situation. We were in total chaos at that time (comment posted on 
June 28, 2014).  
On the other hand, there were some users who were dissatisfied with this 
position because they perceived the horror of May 1998 was under Prabowo’s 
command. For example: 
I am sorry but I cannot accept when Prabowo stated that his superior 
should be blamed for the violence in the Jakarta riots. This is because he 
was the one in Jakarta at that time and he should have been able to stop 
the violence and prevent it from spreading (comment posted on the June 
28, 2014).  
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Others evaluated that Prabowo’s action was politically motivated as a way to 
promote his position and replace his senior Wiranto who, at that time, was the 
commander of the armed forces. Users stated, “I think this is not a matter of how 
his superior treated him, but this is about how Prabowo was trying to elevate his 
position by not stopping the violence” (comment posted on June 28, 2014). 
Another user agreed with this statement by further explaining that Prabowo was 
being political to create the impression of Wiranto’s inability at repressing the 
riots: “The violence in the Jakarta riots was clearly a personal agenda of 
Prabowo to bring Wiranto down because Wiranto was not in Jakarta during the 
critical time” (comment posted on June 29, 2014). Wiranto was indeed outside 
Jakarta during the shootings of some students at the Trisakti University which 
ignited more violence around the city of Jakarta and resulted in 1200 victims in 
the two days of rioting: May 13 and 14. (Lee, 2015). One of the speculations 
circling around the riots is that Prabowo was trying to undermine Wiranto’s 
position by downplaying the violence to show Wiranto at fault (Lee, 2015). It is 
publicly known that Prabowo and Wiranto have never had good chemistry when 
it comes to their working relationship in the armed forces, and this was stated by 
Prabowo himself (Lee, 2015). Some users also noted this circumstance by 
saying, “You know why this is happening? It is clearly because of the rivalry 
between Prabowo and Wiranto. This is even still apparent until today” (comment 
posted on June 29, 2014). Later in the post, some users specified how Wiranto 
declined many of Prabowo’s propositions in the army. For example,” You guys 
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know the fact that Wiranto often times turned down Prabowo’s request; right? 
Like rejecting Prabowo’s proposal for buying new military hardware. This can be 
a reason why Prabowo dislikes Wiranto” (comment posted on June 30, 2014).  
With these comments, we can see that when it comes to constructing a 
presidential candidate’s image, past relationships help voters make inferences 
about the candidate’s character and his or her moral values. Past impressions 
indicated that Prabowo was involved in the May riots; however, many people in 
the current period thought that it was Prabowo’s senior officer who was 
responsible for the violence. Therefore, Prabowo is an innocent man to a certain 
degree in the chaotic incident of the May riots. As explained by Savage (1995), 
one’s perception of presidential candidate’s image is influenced by the interaction 
between the impression they had in the past and the current ones, making both 
important in the image formation process. 
When it comes to Jokowi, we would see a totally different image 
construction. For Jokowi, users thought that people, specifically Megawati and 
other insiders involved in Jokowi’s party (The PDI-P), treated him as if they are 
the driving force that helped pave the way for his presidential candidate position. 
As an example, one user said, “I hate to say this but I guess Megawati and other 
influential PDI-P act as if Jokowi would not be here if they were not behind him” 
(comment posted on June 29, 2014). This statement was agreed to by many 
users stating that “Yes what’s up with Megawati? She treated Jokowi like he is a 
person with lack of power and she thinks that she is the source of Jokowi’s 
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success” (comment posted on June 29, 2014); “Yeah I know that right, Megawati 
would always feel Jokowi is nothing without her support and we can see this in 
the media” (comment posted on June 29, 2014). Many users also speculated that 
if Jokowi was elected as the president, Megawati would control Jokowi, resulting 
in political interference. For example, “We can see it now that Megawati acts as if 
Jokowi was a helpless bureaucrat, but wait until he becomes a president then 
she would not let him go away without her decision in many aspects” (comment 
posted on June 29, 2014). This opinion can be traced back by looking at one of 
the online articles from Time magazine hinting that Jokowi was not in full control 
of his candidacy since he did not have the freedom to choose his vice president 
candidate (Kwok, 2014). Instead, his chairwoman Megawati selected his partner. 
However, many also responded that this impression was created and reinforced 
by the media, especially the online news. For example, one user mentioned “I get 
why people think that Megawati treats Jokowi like he needs of guidance and 
instructions. But I think this is mainly because the media keep portraying him as if 
he is helpless without Megawati” (comment posted on June 30, 2014). These 
postings about Jokowi denoted that there is an interaction between what ordinary 
people think about Jokowi and what the media perceived him to be. As we can 
see, the general public recognized how Megawati and people inside the party 
treated Jokowi differently. Nevertheless, other audiences thought that this 
condition is not entirely true since it comes from the media. These findings were 
in line with a previous study by Trent, Short-Thompson, Mongeau, Nusz, and 
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Trent (2001), which showed that there seemed to be a dynamic when it comes to 
a presidential candidate’s image between the general public and the media. More 
specifically, both may agree and disagree on certain characteristics that are 
important for a candidate, such as the candidate’s honesty or gender. In this 
current study, treatment of others seemed to be an important factor involved in a 
presidential candidate’s image.  
Spiritual Values 
Images that contained spiritual values of the candidates were apparent in 
the users’ comments, particularly comments that stated the role of God in the 
success of the candidates. Many of the users believed that God has an important 
role in determining the presidential race and how God would give a sense of 
protection for each candidate. The sense of love to God coming from the 
candidates was also important for users. As an example for Prabowo, one user 
commented, “I believe that God would give you protection Mr. Prabowo, because 
I can see that you are a faithful Muslim sir and you love God dearly” (comment 
posted on June 25, 2014). Furthermore, many users believed that Prabowo 
would be protected by God concerning his attitude when dealing with his 
competitor. More specifically, users perceived that Prabowo treated his haters 
and competitors in a good manner. This is demonstrated though a comment like, 
“I know for sure that God would give his blessing and assurance for keeping you 
under his guidance because you never say one bad word directed to Jokowi or 
people who dislike your point of view” (comment posted on June 26, 2014); 
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“Since Prabowo never gives negative reaction to those who corner him or people 
who spread false allegation about him, I am sure that God will always stand by 
his side and protect him whenever he goes” (comment posted on June 26, 2014). 
There was also a user who commented, “Sir I believe that God will grant you the 
win because you are a faithful person and God can see this in you” (comment 
posted on June 25, 2014). Moreover, other commenters added their comments 
by giving religious advice to Prabowo; for example, “I know that you are a faithful 
leader, but please sir don’t forget to recite Quran because reciting Quran will help 
you to feel more peaceful and calm” (comment posted on June 25, 2014); “I can 
see that you are a loyal Muslim, but one suggestion sir, please give more money 
to the poor because spiritually it would help you to grant your wish and smooth 
the path of the election process” (comment posted on June 25, 2014). Aside from 
referencing the embrace of God, these results suggested that there was a great 
sense of advice giving coming from Prabowo supporters and the sympathizers. 
More comments that denoted advice giving such as, “With the help from God sir, 
I believe you can pass this trial. Please stay alert and don’t’ forget the five-times 
prayers sir!” (comment posted on June 27, 2014); “Never give up sir because 
God does not sleep and I am sure you have his blessing” (comment posted on 
June 27, 2014).   
Interestingly, various users in the postings also expressed how they 
remember Prabowo in their prayers. For example, “You are a good Muslim sir 
and I can see this radiates within you. You are always in my prayers sir and I 
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hope that Allah would grant my wishes, which is to have you as my president. 
Amin!” (comment posted on June 26, 2014).  Another interesting comment was 
how some users thought that prayers from prominent religious figures would help 
Prabowo in achieving victory and deter negative energies. For instance, “Don’t 
worry sir, I believe those prayers coming from religious figures would boost your 
chance of winning, and most importantly, help to eliminate negative energies 
surrounding you during the campaign” (comment posted on June 26, 2014); 
“Spiritual support from religious figures would definitely help you to win the race 
sir, and neutralize negative energies from your haters” (comment posted on June 
26, 2014).   
As for Jokowi, users showed positive comments of how God contributes to 
his pathway for winning the presidential election while removing obstacles from 
those who do not believe in the Jokowi movement throughout the election period. 
For instance, “Jokowi is a good Muslim and I am totally sure that God would 
always be behind him and bless him to win the election” (comment posted on 
June 30, 2014). While others stated, “Jokowi is not only a good person, but he is 
also a true believer. And I heard from an insider that he has never missed doing 
the five times prayer.  With this characteristic, I believe God will protect him from 
the harm coming from his haters” (comment posted on June 30, 2014). In a 
similar tone, another user also mentioned, “Jokowi is a sincere person and God 
loves sincere individuals. Sir, God would prevent any harm to you because you 
are destined to be our president” (comment posted on June 29, 2014).  
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Interestingly, some users thought that Jokowi deserves to win because 
God would not approve of Prabowo since many of the users believed that 
Prabowo was involved in the kidnapping case during the Jakarta riots. There was 
a degree of comparison using Prabowo’s allegation story as the reason. For 
example, “Jokowi will clearly win the election, because God does not sleep. He 
knows what Prabowo did in the past and how he kidnapped those innocent 
activists who fought against Suharto” (comment posted on June 28, 2014). 
Moreover, users expressed, “Yeah I think Prabowo’s case of abusing human 
rights would hinder him from winning the election. Because in my opinion heaven 
knows that he is the key behind the disappearance of the innocent activists. God 
does not sleep. With this situation, Jokowi will get the victory since he has a 
clean background and never violates human rights” (comment posted on June 
28, 2014). Similarly, another commenter emphasized how God would punish 
Prabowo for his sins in the past related to the kidnapping issue by stating: 
God would punish Prabowo for causing the disappearance of many 
activists. God would not forget what he did to them. Jokowi has never 
been involved in violent acts and I am sure God would approve his effort 
by making him our new president (comment posted on June 29, 2014).  
It can be concluded from these comments that there was a relationship 
between a candidate’s behavior and what the general public think about what 
they do, and connect it to what God in this case would do to the candidate. The 
results also suggested that there is a relationship between religious attitudes of 
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the general public and their perceived image of the candidate. Though this 
research does not measure the religious attitudes of Facebook users, past 
research in the context of American culture revealed that religious attitudes is a 
part of one’s socialization, which continually grows from early life (Sheets, 
Domke, & Greendwald, 2011). This may explain why users embraced God and 
included God when evaluating a candidate’s image. Additionally, results also 
demonstrated that the element of God and the notion of God’s influence was 
overtly apparent in Indonesia’s political context. 
Future State of the Country 
As expected, many users talked about what the country would be like 
under the candidate’s administration, denoting the future of the country. It is not 
surprising to see that there was a sharp difference in terms of statements that 
users employed for both candidates. For Prabowo, users believed that Prabowo 
would be able to eradicate corruption and those involved in exploiting national 
resources. There was a sense of positivity and trust coming from the users about 
Prabowo’s ability to handle these problems. Users also thought that these issues 
were critical and that there was a sense of urgency for the next president. In one 
of the postings, one user stated: 
The heavyweight corrupters and the mafia who are stealing the nation’s 
wealth should be afraid of Prabowo. They are worried about Prabowo 
winning the election and becoming the next president, so they are trying to 
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put Prabowo down. This attitude is similar to a foreign intelligence who is 
afraid of Prabowo’s power (comment posted on June 30, 2014).  
Another user mentioned similar perceptions, “Yes I do think that the big players 
who have been corrupting many important assets are extremely afraid of 
Prabowo and do not want him to be our future leader” (comment posted on June 
30, 2014). Furthermore, users believed that Prabowo would be able to reduce 
crime rates and make Indonesia a safer country in general. Comments such as 
“If Prabowo becomes our new president, criminals would not have the nerve to 
harm people and we would feel safe anywhere to go. However, today’s criminals 
are stronger than the police. Therefore, we need a leader who is strong like him” 
(comment posted on June 30, 2014); “If we choose Prabowo, national security 
would be improved and it would lower number of criminals. I believe this because 
Prabowo entails a characteristic of a strong leader” (comment posted on June 
30, 2014) are common in postings.  
On the other hand, there are also a group of users who believed that the 
future of Indonesia would be in a critical period if Prabowo won the election. 
These users feel that Prabowo’s image as someone who is involved in the 
Jakarta riots may bring negativity to Indonesia’s image in international eyes. It 
can be seen from users’ comments like, “I think there would be a chaos if 
Prabowo wins the presidential race because his involvement in the Jakarta riots 
can interfere Indonesia’s politics, and this also affects Indonesia’s image 
internationally” (comment posted on June 30, 2014). Moreover, users also 
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thought that if Prabowo wins the election, it would affect the diplomatic 
relationship between Indonesia and the United States since Prabowo did not 
obtain a visa permit to enter the United States. For example, “I am worried that it 
would affect the international relations between Indonesia and the U.S. because I 
think people in the White House dislike Prabowo’s style and his past” (comment 
made on June 30, 2014). Moreover, Prabowo who was allegedly involved in a 
significant human abuse case left a strong impression that he would conduct the 
administration with an authoritarian style, putting fear into some users. For 
instance, “I think we would be a fearful nation if Prabowo becomes our president 
because he may enforce us to follow his demands, and if not he is the type of 
person who can enforce violence to serve his interest” (comment posted on July 
1, 2014). These results demonstrated that people are actively assessing people’s 
characteristics, including when evaluating a candidate’s image, in political 
settings. As suggested by earlier literature, in essence people actively engage in 
assessing other individuals; traits throughout their daily activity (Fridkin & 
Kenney, 2011). 
For Jokowi, users felt that the country would be in great danger because 
they worry Jokowi would follow in similar footsteps to Megawati, which is selling 
national assets to foreign countries, and being slow when making important 
decisions. For example, one user stated “I am worried that Jokowi would have 
similar style like his chairwoman, Megawati, who sold our national satellite to 
Singapore. As a result, we are under surveillance from the neighboring countries. 
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Don’t you forget about this matter” (comment posted on June 27, 2014). Various 
users gave similar responses by saying “Yeah I have a strong feeling that Jokowi 
would probably sell our national assets and this will create instability to our 
nation. Do you want this to happen people?” (comment posted on June 27, 
2014); “First he will sell our important resources and then slowly our national 
stability would go downward. This is so scary!” (comment posted on June 27, 
2014). In addition, many users think that Jokowi would adopt similar policies 
made by Megawati, and this situation is considered negative. For instance, a 
user stated, “If Jokowi wins the race then I will suspect that more islands will 
disintegrate from our territory, and more people would suffer from poverty since 
outsourcing remains in the employment agreement. I don’t want my future to be 
like this people!” (comment posted on June 28, 2014). It appeared that many 
users objected to Megawati’s employment construction pathway that allows 
outsourcing. One reason is because they feel that outsourcing would limit their 
ability to secure jobs since the relationship is temporary, meaning that workers 
could end up unemployed at any time. During Megawati’s administration, she 
allowed the proliferation of contract workers and outsourcing as a way to tackle 
the unemployment issue (Booth, 2016). However, in practice, many considered 
this act to bring disadvantages, especially for employees.  
On the other hand, various users seemed to believe that Jokowi would 
bring a better future for Indonesia, especially to Indonesia’s economy. This is 
mainly due to Jokowi’s previous success as a Mayor of Solo. For example, “I 
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think we would have a better economy situation because Jokowi has successfully 
improved Solo and this is a good indication for a larger context” (comment posted 
on June 30, 2014). Another user gave a positive response by commenting, 
“Jokowi is not only a good mayor but he also a good manager to his furniture 
company. I think this is what we need to improve our future economy” (comment 
posted on June 30, 2014). Jokowi’s credibility as a good mayor was 
internationally recognized and he received the title as one of the best mayors 
worldwide (Ardytia & Rulistia, 2013). In addition, he was the second runner-up for 
the best world Mayor prize in 2012; a contest conducted by a non-profit 
foundation namely The Philanthropic City Mayors Foundation (Ardytia & Rulistia, 
2013). It appeared that Jokowi’s achievement as mayor of Solo left a positive 







The current study aimed to explore how Indonesian voters used Facebook 
during the 2014 presidential election to draw conclusions about how voters 
constructed the image of political candidates. Because of the strong polarization 
generated by the rather different political agendas and political backgrounds of 
the candidates, the general public was intensely involved in the campaign and 
interacted in online discussions on Facebook and other social media. The 
debates raged around various political topics related to elections, including 
debates related to the ideal candidate and how the two candidates were 
perceived. The study of how these perceptions were constructed is important as 
a contribution to a larger study of public opinion formation in Indonesia.  
The study used one of the presidential candidates’ Facebook page, 
Prabowo’s Facebook page, as the data collection venue, with special focus on 
the reactions to an official story posted on June 19, 2014, in which media 
celebrities endorsed Prabowo in a song. That song proved polarizing and 
attracted both negative and positive comments about the candidate. Thus, the 
reactions to this story offered excellent insights into the tensions involved in the 
construction of a candidate’s image.   
Using a thematic analysis, the study identified several themes that show 
how voters constructed candidate images. In particular, the study concluded that 
voters focused on three areas: the relationship between the perceived attributes 
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of the candidate and national identity; the relationship between the candidate and 
his supporters as a distinct social group; the perceived personality traits of the 
candidate and the ability of supporters to identify with him on a personal level. In 
that regard, the analysis focusses on the references related to political scandal, 
treatment of other people, spiritual values, and the future state of the country.   
The findings show how voters connected an idealized image of the “right” 
candidate to the construction of national identity in a discourse with nationalist 
overtones. Voters measured candidates’ abilities in defending national rights and 
national image when dealing with foreign policies. As shown in the data, the 
references to national identity were very strong in the comments of Prabowo 
supporters through which they shared similar negative sentiments directed at 
foreign intervention, anti-colonialism, and the desire to be respected by other 
nations. It appeared that there was a sense of urgency to stop the cycle of 
interventions coming from foreign governments so that the nation would be able 
to preserve its national cohesiveness and prevent separatism. This included 
blocking surveillance from neighboring countries. Users were demanding a 
leader capable of deterring foreign intervention maneuvers. Most importantly, 
according to users, the construction of the idealized candidate was someone with 
a strong anti-foreigner attitude, especially when interacting with international 
policies. One reason for this attitude is the way users remembered the historical 
past of Indonesia which is very closely related to the colonial power of the Dutch 
government. Users believed that Prabowo carried the image of a leader who 
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strongly promoted nationalism to limit foreign intervention and to elevate the 
nation’s dignity. Conversely, users thought that Jokowi was less able to promote 
a sense of national identity. Moreover, users also employed a metaphor to not 
only describe the image of candidates by highlighting the “Asia’s Tiger” status, 
but also to compare which candidate has a stronger character to revive the 
Indonesian economy and bring it back to its former glory. Users stated that 
Prabowo often articulated the “Asia’s Tiger” slogan in his public persona, 
particularly during his internal campaign within his party, and this shaped his 
public image as a strong leader for the country. This result confirmed that 
important events can provide important context which allows voters to evaluate a 
candidate’s image (Zakahi, 2004; Warner, Carlin, Winfrey, Schnoebelen, & 
Trosanovski, 2011; Mckiney & Stephenson, 2002). In the case of Prabowo, the 
internal campaign was the context that enhanced his public image in the eyes of 
constituents.  
In the next theme, users constructed candidate image through “us vs 
them” among the group of supporters meaning that users employed a 
constructed image of their candidate to create a contrast between themselves as 
a group and others. This was done through the use of non-verbal symbols to tie a 
candidate’s image to the collective identity of his supporters. The non-verbal 
gestures of the hand sign not only signified the candidate’s image, but also 
served as a tool for in-group cohesiveness and as a strategy for defining the 
group identity of the social supporters in a way that distinguished it from the out-
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group. Moreover, users also projected images of public figures who supported 
the candidate onto the image of the candidate and his supporters. In fact, users 
looked at the celebrities who endorsed a candidate as an element that 
characterized the candidate’s image. Interestingly, the perceived failure of the 
celebrities who supported a candidate was seen as a reflection of the candidate’s 
own failure. These results confirmed previous research by Wheeler (2013), which 
denoted that celebrities’ endorsements may not always produce desirable results 
for the candidates. Furthermore, we can see how voters formed a political image 
that involved not only one specific stimulus, but instead was a collection of 
information owned by the voters to judge candidates. As stated by Boulding 
(1973), image is about all the stimuli that occur internally or externally over the 
course of peoples’ lives.  
For the personal traits of candidates, users discussed how certain 
qualities of the candidates matched their own personality traits or qualities, such 
as a degree of sincerity, a sense of caring towards animals, and religious 
attitudes. To a certain degree we can assume that these qualities are essential 
for presidential candidates. Interestingly, users noted small contributions made 
by the candidate when solving problems relevant to sensitive issue, such as 
handling animal exploitation cases. It appeared that the media, especially the 
online media, highlighted this animal abuse issue. One possible reason why this 
became an agenda for the media is because animal abuse is one of the issues 
that are critical for fauna wellbeing in Indonesia. Though the dynamic of public 
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opinion regarding candidate images fluctuated throughout the campaign trail, the 
media can provide an opportunity for voters to actually think about and evaluate 
candidates’ images (Balmas & Sheafer, 2010; Kiousis, Bantimaroudis, & Ban, 
1999). Moreover, the fact that users highlighted religious attitudes shows that 
religion is overtly essential for the political setting in Indonesia and became a 
factor connecting the constituents and candidates. What we can take from these 
results is that voters are more likely to construct positive traits for candidates 
when they hold similar views and positions to their own. Previous research has 
demonstrated that voters tend to build positive sentiments of candidates when 
voters perceive they are similar in some way such as opinions or political 
positions (Kinder, 1978; Sears, 1983).  
Users constructed candidate images by making references to a 
candidate’s historical past, especially political scandals that shadowed a 
candidate’s reputation. The Prabowo political scandal stemming from the May 
1998 riot played a large role in shaping his negative image as an authoritarian 
leader. Many users believed that Prabowo’s involvement in the riot would result 
in a negative image for the nation. On the other hand, many users also defended 
Prabowo saying that he was only following the commands of his senior officer--
something Prabowo himself has declared to the public regarding his involvement. 
What we can see is that image is not a one-way street dependent on the 
candidate’s actions, but is also affected by the political messages surrounding 
the candidate; i.e., the image can change over time. As Prabowo spread new 
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messages stating that he was not the actor behind the May 1998 riot, the public 
started to perceive him in a different light. Although this research does not 
measure the progression of Prabowo’s image throughout the elections, his 
defense by the public shows that new messages have the ability to change 
public’s perception of a candidate’s image. As explained by Hacker (2004), there 
is a degree of relationship between a candidate’s image and political messages 
surrounding the campaigners. Moreover, we should also note that current 
impressions that voters have of candidates are an important indication of whether 
the candidate has a positive or negative image in the eyes of voters. It is clear 
from the data that many users still believe that Prabowo was involved in the May 
riot, and therefore, voters viewed him in a negative light. In other words, users 
seemed unable to forget what happened in the past.  
Surprisingly, for Jokowi, many users talked about his physical features 
and tied those attributes to his image as a candidate. Users believed that his slim 
posture denoted weakness and incompetency as leader, and therefore, they did 
not see him as an ideal image for their presidential candidate. These findings 
supported previous studies showing how physical appearance can influence 
judgments of voters (Mater, Spezio, Kim, Todorov, Adolphs, & Alvarez, 2010). 
However, it should also be noted that physical features vary and their potential to 
affect voters’ perception of a candidate’s image depends on the availability of 
other heuristic cues (Todorov, Mandisodza, Goren, & Hall, 2005). Although the 
current research does not specifically assess this notion, it is important to 
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mention since users inferred physical appearance to the candidate image. Users 
also discussed how Jokowi was perceived as a bad Muslim and how he has 
good relations with the bad conglomerates. The smear campaigns were in full-
swing during the election, to the point where people were saying things that were 
outrageous and impossible, and this negative campaigning was very visible in 
the online world during the 2014 presidential election. Previous studies have 
shown that distribution of negative political messages on social media shaped 
negative evaluations of the candidate’s image (Grabe & Bucy, 2009). This is 
because it is very difficult to control a candidate’s image in the social media world 
(Gueorguieva, 2008; Bronstein, 2013).  
Another important strategy for the construction of a candidate’s image was 
through what other people did to the candidate. In this context, the past once 
again helps voters construct a candidate’s character and morality. Past 
impressions that indicated a bleak political past or terror were filtered by the 
current period impressions, signaling a change in voter’s thoughts. One’s 
perception of presidential candidate image can be influenced by the interaction 
between past thoughts and current period thoughts (Savage, 1995). Users also 
perceived a close tie between the political party and its leader to be 
disproportional which created an impression of weakness for the candidate. One 
important aspect of this theme is that it appeared to be easier for users to pay 
attention to the negative qualities of the candidate than their positive features. As 
described by Shear (1983), voters have stricter attitudes when evaluating the 
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positive features of voters, therefore, creating more space for negative 
evaluations.  
Voters also employed another strategy of image construction by relating 
candidate’s behavior to what God would do to them. Users applied both positive 
and negative evaluation to the candidates. Interestingly, in this theme, it 
appeared that users made another reference about a candidate’s political past. 
However, in this context, users connect the political past factor to what God 
would do to the candidates in relation to the election results. Users strongly 
weighted the past behavior of candidates and made positive or negative 
evaluations depending on what they perceived to be the candidate’s behavior. It 
appears, in a larger context, that past behavior and reputation play a significant 
role in the way users construct political image, and also showed that voters use a 
complicated process when assessing a candidate’s image, i.e. it is not only 
based on affective or perception of competency alone. Instead, users try to 
include past behavior and spiritual entity as a part of the image construction 
process. Indeed, as described by Boulidng (1973), individuals employed all kinds 
of stimuli when judging a candidate’s image.    
Lastly, users tried to construct a candidate image by making projections of 
what the country would be like under the candidate’s administration. In this 
context, users believed that a candidate’s political past, characteristics, 
reputation, and treatment from others can contribute to the overall performance 
of the candidate in developing the country. Prabowo’s strong leadership was 
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perceived by many users as beneficial not only to his public image, but also to 
the image of the nation in general. With Jokowi, the absence of a negative 
political past resulted in positive evaluations from voters. Users also thought that 
he was a better leader due to his success as a Mayor of Solo. Since the 
beginning of the campaign, many media outlets reported that Jokowi is a 
hardworking leader, suggesting important qualities for the nation. This situation 
may have influenced why voters thought Jokowi was a better leader than 
Prabowo. However, this may not be the only reason. There is a chance that 
Jokowi had already projected certain images from the beginning of the campaign. 
Past research has demonstrated that political actors often display positive traits 
to attract potential voters and obtain positive public images (Hacker, 2004). 
Therefore, the dual-interaction between Jokowi himself and what the media 
believe about him influenced the overall image of Jokowi. In the case of 
Prabowo, users perceived him as another authoritarian figure who would spread 
fear throughout the country. Once again, there was a reference to political 
scandal, which users perceived negatively for candidate image and the image of 
Indonesia internationally.  
The study also demonstrates how Facebook can be an alternative form of 
public sphere where everyone is able to perform what Habermas (1989) 
suggested, that is, to engage in a rational discourse, away from the trappings of 
social ranking (or, in this case, the ideological bubbles) that would otherwise 
prevent individuals from talking to one another. As we can see from the analysis, 
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opponents of Prabowo are allowed to post their comments on Prabowo’s 
Facebook page freely and to propose different terms for the debate or criticism 
about presidential candidates. The analysis shows how Indonesian Facebook 
users found in social media a forum for exchanging ideas not only with people 
who shared similar beliefs, but also with individuals who espoused different 
views. This situation conforms to Habermas’s (1989) notion of public sphere 
which facilitates different kinds of discussions. Even so, if we image the public 
sphere to be akin to Habermas’s image of the coffeehouse (1989), a place where 
everybody can enter, as long as they are able to pay, then social media is 
similar, in that not everyone has equal opportunity to “enter” and engage in the 
discussion. Though Facebook is highly popular in Indonesia, the lack of 
infrastructure in the remote villages in Indonesia can prevent some individuals to 
voice their opinions. Therefore, in practice, not all Indonesians have the equal 
chance to involve themselves in this virtual public sphere provided by Facebook. 
Aside from that, the current research shows how Facebook in the context of 
Indonesian political realm can be a virtual public space where it enhances 
political expressions and the growing process of democracy. This is because 
various people from different backgrounds can bypass the restriction that they 
may encounter in the offline world when expressing opinions.  
Overall, this current study reveals that users constructed various 
strategies when evaluating a candidate’s image. As suggested by Lippmann 
(1922) people are not able to deal with too many elements in their social world, 
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and thus, they need to create a simplified framework. This applies to the current 
study, in how voters tried to simplify the complexity of a candidate to particular 
themes that were then used to provide a basis for inferences about what the 
candidate stood for. The themes and the inferences they afforded were used in 
combination to make sense of the political world. Moreover, when it comes to 
constructing image, it seemed that users put heavier weight on certain 
information as their basis for judgment. It is argued by scholars that voters in 
general are not highly motivated to collect in-depth information about candidates, 
and in fact many voting decisions are actually made from few considerations 
(Neuman, 1986). This argument suggested that voters may only focus on a 
particular strategy to mold their perceptions regarding political image.  
In summary, by highlighting the main themes that polarized public 
discourse and how these themes were used by voters to make inferences about 
the ability of the candidates to lead Indonesia, this study contributes to the 
analysis of public opinion formation.  
The study has both theoretical and practical implications. Theoretically, 
the study contributes to understanding how voters dynamically construct 
perceptions about political candidates. More specifically, the study demonstrated 
how the image of a political candidate is a complex construction that draws on a 
variety of signifiers, both political and entertainment-related, and connects to 
voters in multiple ways and across multiple contexts, social, cultural, and 
personal. In the special case of Indonesia, the study highlighted the importance 
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of national identity in the process of public opinion formation. In respect to the 
candidate, the inferences based on spiritual values, political behavior, and 
treatment of others showed that there are external factors that help voters when 
shaping candidate’s image, and, to an extent, the elements that polarize the 
public the most could be unpredictable. Nevertheless, the analysis also showed 
the great importance of political scandal in the Indonesian context. It appeared 
that in the case of Indonesia, scandalous incidents involving human rights abuse 
could produce a deep negative image that can strongly attach to voters. At a 
practical level, the study shows potential presidential candidates what strategies 
can most efficiently grab potential voters, but also what citizens need to 
understand from their leaders.  
The study has some important limitations. First, the analyzed sample is a 
sample of convenience, rather than a random sample, and the comments were 
not collected from both candidates’ Facebook pages. The computer program 
used to collect the data does not allow a chronological order in the extraction of 
the comments.  It would be better for future research to include better computer 
software or techniques able to collect the data in a chronological order, so that 
we would have a better sense of how the dynamics of the discussion change 
over time and observe turns in the conversation. Moreover, because the study 
only collected data from Prabowo’s page, the study may have missed certain 
themes proposed by supporters of Jokowi. However, the study does not make 
the claim that the analysis captures all themes at work in the discourse of the 
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supporters of both candidates. Rather, the study only seeks to offer a “thick 
description” of some of the themes that helped voters construct the image of the 
two candidates.  
A second limitation of the study has to do with its validity. As in all 
interpretive research, researchers use their own subjective perception to interpret 
the material. In this case, I have attempted to mitigate validity issues by ensuring 
that a peer, working independently, reached the same conclusions I did when 
observing a sub-sample of my material. However, a different (and probably 
better) way of mitigating issues of validity would be to employ triangulation—
namely, to collect different material about how supporters establish candidate 
perceptions (e.g. material from a different social media site) and show how an 
analysis of that material corroborates my conclusions in this case. Here, I 
attempted to corroborate some of my conclusions by reference to mainstream 
media coverage. A better way would be to simply contact some of the users who 
left comments on Prabowo’s page and verify with them my understanding of the 
nature of their perceptions.  
Finally, the study was collecting comments from a language other than 
English, and this may open the possibility of error in the language translation. 
Future research may also include another form of social media involving photos 
of candidates since this study showed that the physical appearance of 




ABC news joins forces with Facebook. (2007, December 18). Retrieved from 
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=3899006&page=1  
Abdillah, L. A. (2014). Social media as political campaign party in Indonesia. 
Jurnal Ilmiah Matrik, 16, 1-10. Retrieved from 
https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1406/1406.4086.pdf 
Ahmad Dhani’s Nazi uniform controversy. (2014, June 25). The Jakarta Post. 
Retrieved from http://www.thejakartapost.com 
Ahyani, M. M. I. (1999, May 29). Internet fails to woo most political parties. The 
Jakarta Post. Retrieved www.TheJakartaPost.com 
Alujevic-Vesnic, L. (2012). Political participation and web 2.0 in Europe: A case 
study of Facebook. Public Relations Review, 38(3), 466-470. 
doi:10.1016/j.pubrev.2012.01.010 
Amaro, S., Henriques, C., & Duarte, P. (2016, June). Comparing millennials with 
their predecessors regarding online travel behaviours: A logistical 
regression modelling approach. Paper presented at the European 
Conference on Research Methodology for Business and Management 
Studies, London 
Ananta, A., Arifin, E. N., & Suryadinata, L. (2005). Emerging democracy in 




Anggraini, D. A., Mostofa, M. H. H., & Sadewo, Y. I. (2014). Analysis of political 
campaign through Facebook on Indonesian 2014 presidential election. 
Social Sciences, 6, 1-9. doi:10.11648/j.ss.s.2014030601.11  
Anstead, N., & O'Loughlin, B. (2015). Social media analysis and public opinion: 
The 2010 UK general election. Journal of Computer‐Mediated 
Communication, 20(2), 204-220. doi:101111jcc4.12102 
Arditya, A., & Rulistia, N. D. (2013, January 9). Jokowi named one of the world’s 
best mayors. The Jakarta Post. Retrieved from 
http://www.thejakartapost.com 
Arsana, I. M. (2013, January 30). Are we losing more islands after Sipadan-
Ligitan dispute? The Jakarta Post. Retrieved from 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/ 
Asian financial crisis in Indonesia. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.indonesia-
investments.com/culture/economy/asian-financial-crisis/item246? 
Aspinall, E. (2015). Oligarchy populism and economic nationalism: Prabowo 
Subianto’s challenge to Indonesian democracy. Jakarta, Forthcoming.  
Aspinall, E. (2016). The new nationalism in Indonesia. Asia & the Pacific Policy 
Studies, 3(1), 72-82. doi:10.1002/app5.111 
Azali, K. (2014). The role of internet and social media in the 2014. The Network, 




Azra, A. (2003). The Megawati presidency: Challenge of political Islam. In H. 
Soesatro & A. Smith (Eds.), Governance in Indonesia: Challenges facing 
the Megawati presidency. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 
Bachelard, M. (2014). Prabowo Subianto: Will be the next president? The 
Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved from http://www.smh.com.au 
Baek, Y. (2015). Political mobilization through social network sites: The 
mobilizing power of political messages received from SNS friends. 
Computers in Human Behavior, 44, 12-19. doi: 10.1016/j.chb.2014.11.021  
Balmas, M., & Sheafer, T. (2010). Candidate image in election campaigns: 
Attribute agenda setting, affective priming, and voting intentions. 
International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 22(2), 204-229. doi: 
10.1093/ijpor/edq009  
Baruh, L., & Popescu, M. (2008). Guiding metaphors of nationalism: The Cyprus 
issue and the construction of Turkish national identity in online 
discussions. Discourse and Communication, 2(1), 79-96. doi: 
10.1177/1750481307085578. 
Basinger, S. (2013). Scandals and congressional elections in the post-Watergate 
era. Political Research Quarterly, 66(2), 385-398. Retrieved from 
http://xerxes.calstate.edu/sanbernardino/ 
Batorski, D., & Grzywińska, I. (2017). Three dimensions of the public sphere on 




Baumgartner, J. C., & Morris, J. S. (2010). MyFaceTube politics: Social 
networking websites and political engagement of young adults. Social 
Science Computer Review, 28, 24–44. doi:10.1177/0894439309334325  
Benedict, L. P. (2014). A critical synthesis and thematic analysis of the use of 
social media in higher education marketing (Doctoral dissertation). 
Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/1615348733 
Benoit, W., Mckinney, M., & Stephenson, M. (2002). Effects of watching primary 
debates in the 2000 U.S. presidential campaign. Journal of 
Communication, 52(2), 316-331. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2002.tb02547.x 
Billig, M. (1995). Banal nationalism. London, UK: SAGE. 
Bing, N. (2015). Kenya decides: Kiswahili, social media and politics in Kenya’s 
2013 general elections. Journal of African Media Studies, 7(2), 165-183. 
doi:10.1386/jams.7.2.165_1 
Blumer, H. (1948). Public opinion and public opinion polling. American 
Sociological Review, 13(5), 542-549. Retrieved from 
http://www.uvm.edu/~dguber/POLS234/articles/blumer.pdf 
Boyatzis, R. E. (1998). Transforming qualitative information: Thematic analysis 
and code development. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Bradberry, L. (2016). The effect of religion on candidate preference in the 2008 




Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006) Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative 
Research in Psychology, 3, 77-101. Retrieved from 
http://eprints.uwe.ac.uk/21155/3/Teaching%20thematic%20analysis%20R
esearch%20Repository%20version.pdf 
Bronstein, J. (2013). Like me! Analyzing the 2012 presidential candidates’ 
Facebook pages. Online Information Review, 37(2), 173 – 192. doi: 
10.1108/OIR-01-2013-0002. 
Brooks, C., Manza, J., & Bolzendahl, C. (2003). Voting behavior and political 
sociology: Theories, debates, and future directions. Research in Political 
Sociology, 137–173. 






Bush, A., Martin, C., & Bush, V. (2004). Sports celebrity influence on the 
behavioral intentions of generation y. Journal of Advertising Research, 
44(1), 108-118. doi:  10.1017/S0021849904040206  
Butcher, J. G. (2013). The international court of justice and the territorial dispute 
between Indonesia and Malaysia in the Sulawesi sea. Contemporary 
122 
 
. 257–235), 2(35Southeast Asia, Retrieved from 
http://xerxes.calstate.edu/sanbernardino/ 
Calhoun, B. (2012). Shaping the public sphere: English coffeehouses and French 
salons and the age of the enlightenment. Colgate Academic Review, 3, 
75-99. Retrieved from http://commons.colgate.edu/car/vol3/iss1/7 
Callahan, S. P., & Ledgerwood, A. (2016). On the psychological function of flags 
and logos: Group identity symbols increase perceived entitativity. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 110, 528-550. Retrieved from 
https://ucdavis.app.box.com/s/qslj3ilncta2g6mg6h7n0co6e7p854l2 
Camilleri, J., & Schottmann. S. (2013). Religion and conflict in Muslim Southeast 
Asia: Negotiating tense pluralisms. Retrieved from 
https://books.google.com/ 
Carey, J. W. (1989). Communication as culture: Essays on media and society. 
Boston: Unwin Hyman 
Carey, J. W. (1995). The press, public opinion, and public discourse. In T. L. 
Glasser & C. T. Salmon (Eds.), Public opinion and the communication of 
consent (pp. 373-402). New York, NY: Guilford Press.   
Carlisle, J., & Patton, R. (2013). Is social media changing how we understand 
political engagement? An analysis of Facebook and the 2008 presidential 




Colson, D. (2003). Sovereignty over pulau Ligitan and pulau Sipadan 
Indonesia/Malaysia. The American Journal of International Law, 97(2), 
398-406. Retrieved from 
http://xerxes.calstate.edu/sanbernardino/articles/record?id=jstor_archive_
110.2307%2F3100115 
Crouch, H. A. (2010). Political reform in Indonesia after Suharto. Singapore: 
ISEAS.  
Currie, R., Campbell-Trant, T., & Seaton, S. (2011). Joining the in-crowd: 
Symbols for backpacker identity. International Journal of Culture, Tourism 
and Hospitality Research, 5(1), 47-56. Retrieved from 
http://xerxes.calstate.edu/sanbernardino/articles/record?id=emerald10.110
8%2F17506181111111753 
Dagg, C. (2007). The 2004 elections in Indonesia: Political reform and 
democratization. Asia Pacific Viewpoint, 48(1), 47-59. 10.1111/j.1467-
8373.2007.00329.x 
Dahlberg, L. (2004). The Habermasian public sphere: A specification of the 
idealized conditions of democratic communication. Studies in Social and 
Political Thought, 10, 2–18. Retrieved from 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/254894156  
David, B., & Turner, J. (1999). Studies in self‐categorization and minority 
conversion: The in‐group minority in intragroup and intergroup contexts. 
124 
 
British Journal of Social Psychology, 38(2), 115-134. Retrieved from 
http://xerxes.calstate.edu/sanbernardino 
Denzin, N. K. (2001). Interpretive interactionism (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage. 
Dewi, S. (2014, July 2). Artists to hold concert to support Jokowi-Kalla. Retrieved 
from http://www.thejakartapost.com 
Dey, I. (1993). Qualitative data analysis: A user-friendly guide for social scientist. 
Retrieved form http://www.classmatandread.net/ 
Dimitrova, D., & Bystrom, D. (2013). The effects of social media on political 
participation and candidate image evaluations in the 2012 Iowa caucuses. 
American Behavioral Scientist, 57(11), 1568-1583 
Ellis, A. (2016). Indonesia: Transition and change but electoral system continuity. 
In J. Colomer (Ed.), The handbook of electoral system choice (pp. 497-
511). Retrieved from https://books.google.com/books 
Emarketer. (2016). In Indonesia, Facebook remains the most popular social site. 
Retrieved from https://www.emarketer.com/Article/Indonesia-Facebook-
Remains-Most-Popular-Social-Site/1014126 
Emruli, S., Zejneli, T., & Agai, F. (2011). Youtube and political communication - 
Macedonian case. International Journal of Computer Science Issues 
(IJCSI), 8(4), 460-466. Retrieved from http://libproxy.lib.csusb.edu 
Facebook press room. (2015). Statistics. Retrieved October 8, 2015, from 
Facebook: http://facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics  
125 
 
Facebook. (2014). Stats [Data file]. Retrieved from 
http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ 
Fernandes, J., Giurcanu, M., Bowers, K., & Neely, J. (2010). The writing on the 
wall: A content analysis of college students' Facebook groups for the 2008 
presidential election. Mass Communication and Society, 13(5), 653-675. 
doi: 10.1080/15205436.2010.516865 
Frame, A., & Brachotte, G. (2015). Le tweet strategique: Use of Twitter as a pr 
tool by French politicians. Public Relations Review, 41(2), 278-287. doi: 
10.1016/j.pubrev.2014.11.005 
Fridkin, L. F., & Kenney, P. J. (2011). The role of candidate traits in campaigns. 
The Journal of Politics, 73(1), 61-73. doi:10.1017/S0022381610000861  
Fukuoka, Y., & Thalang, C. (2014). The legislative and presidential elections in 
Indonesia in 2014. Electoral Studies, 36, 230-235. doi: 
10.1016/j.electstud.2014.09.007 
Funk, C. 1999. Bringing the candidate into models of candidate evaluation. The 
Journal of Politics 61(3), 700–20. Retrieved from 
http://xerxes.calstate.edu/sanbernardino 
Gamson, J. (2001). Normal sins: Sex scandals narratives as institutional morality 




Gazali, E. (2014). Learning by clicking: An experiment with social media 
democracy in Indonesia. International Communication Gazette, 76(4-5), 
425-439. doi:101177/1748048514524119  
Gazzar, N. E. (2013). The role of social media in the formation of public opinion 
towards Islamists: A content analysis. Journal of Arab and Muslim Media 
Research, 6(1), 35-49. Retrieved from http://libproxy.lib.csusb.edu 
Geertz, C. (1973). The interpretation of cultures: Selected essays. New 
York: Basic Books. 
Gionis, A., Terzi, E., & Tsaparas. (2013). Opinion maximization in social 
networks. Paper presented at the Siam International Conference on Data 
Mining, Austin, TX. Abstract retrieved from https://arxiv.org/abs/1301.7455 
Given, L. (Ed). (2008). The sage encyclopedia of qualitative research 
methodology. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Glynn, C. J., Herbest, S., Lindman, M., O’Keefe, G. J., & Shapiro, R. Y. (2016). 
Public Opinion (3rd ed.). Boulder, CO: Westview. 
Goffman, E. (1973). The presentation of self in everyday life. New York, 
NY: Overlook. 
Gomez, J. (2014). Social media impact on Malaysia’s 13th general election. Asia 
Pacific Media Educator, 24(1), 95-105. doi: 10.1177/1326365X14539213  
Goodnow, T. (2013). Facing off: A comparative analysis of Obama and Romney 
Facebook timeline photographs. American Behavioral Scientist, 57, 1584-
1595. doi: 10.1177/0002764213489013  
127 
 
Grabe, M., & Bucy, E. (2009). Image bite politics: News and the visual framing of 
elections [e-Book version]. Retrieved from 
http://xerxes.calstate.edu/sanbernardino/books/record?id=b2369399 
Graham, T. (2015). Everyday political talk in the everyday internet-based public 
sphere. In S. Coleman & D. Freelon (Eds.), Handbook of digital politics 
(pp. 247-263). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.  
Grote, R., & Roder, T. (2011). Constitutionalism in Islamic countries: Between 
upheaval and continuity. New York: Oxford UP.  
Gueorguieva, V. (2008). “Voters, MySpace, and YouTube: The impact of 
alternative communication on the 2006 election cycle and beyond,” Social 
Science Computer Review, 26(3), 288–300. 
doi:10.1177/0894439307305636 
Habermas, J. (1989). The structural transformation of the public sphere: An 
inquiry into a category of bourgeois society. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 
Hacker, K. L. (1995). Interpersonal communication and the formation of 
candidate images. In K. L. Hacker (Ed.), Candidate images in presidential 




Hacker, K. L. (2004). A dual-processing perspective. In K. L. Hacker (Ed.), 





Halim, H. & Aritonang, M. S. (2014, July 20). Oligarchs strengthen grip on major 
parties. The Jakarta Post. Retrieved from www.TheJakartaPost.com 
Hanson, G., Haridakis, P., Cunningham, A., Sharma, R., & Ponder, J. (2010). 
The 2008 presidential campaign: Political cynicism in the age of 
Facebook, Myspace, and Youtube. Mass Communication and Society, 
13(5), 584-607. doi:10.1080/15205436.2010.513470 
Hiebert, M., Osius, T., & Poling, G. (2013). A U.S.-Indonesia partnership for 
2020: Recommendations for forging a 21st century relationship. Retrieved 
from https://books.google.com/books 
Highvoltage. (2014, June 30). Lagu Indonesia bangkit Prabowo-Hatta ft Ahmad 
Dhani, Virzha, Husein, Nowel - we will rock you [Video file]. Retrieved from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y0LzsVJT9IE  
Hill, D. (2003). Communication for a new democracy: Indonesia's first online 
elections. The Pacific Review, 16(4), 525-548. Retrieved from 
http://web.a.ebscohost.com.libproxy.lib.csusb.edu/ehost/detail/  
History of elections in Indonesia. (2014, June 10). Retrieved from 
http://jakartaglobe.id/archive/history-elections-indonesia/ 
Hoffner, C., & Rehkoff, R. A. (2011). Young voters' responses to the 2004 U.S. 
presidential election: Social identity, perceived media influence, and 
129 
 
behavioral outcomes. Journal of Communication, 6(4), 732‐757. doi: 
10.1111/j.1460‐2466.2011.01565.x  
Hosen, N. (2007). Shari’a and constitutional reform in Indonesia. Singapore: 
ISEAS.  
Huda, A. (2010). Filming ayat-ayat cinta: The making of a Muslim public sphere 
in Indonesia. Journal of Indonesian Islam, 4(1), 1-43. doi: 
10.15642/JIIS.2010.4.1.43-61 
Ibahrine, M. (2008). Mobile communication and sociopolitical change in the Arab 
world. In J. E. Katz. (Ed.), Handbook of mobile communication studies (pp. 
257-272). Massachusetts: The MIT Press. doi:10.15642/JIIS.2010.4.1.43-
61 
Indonesia Facebook page statistics. (2014, November 10). Retrieved from 
http://www.socialbakers.com/statistics/facebook/pages/total/indonesia/ 
Indonesia's presidential front-runner battles the puppet image. (2014, June 29). 
Reuters. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com 
Indrayana, D. (2007). Amandemen UUD 1945: Antara mitos dan pembongkaran. 
Bandung, Indonesia: Mizan.  
Ini alasan Prabowo tidak belanja dan mendadak naik ojek ke Tanah Abang.  
(2014, June 20). Kompas. Retrieved from http://nasional.kompas.com 
International Business Publications. (2013). Indonesia country study guide 





Jacobson, G. (1999). Impeachment politics in the 1998 congressional elections. 
Political Science Quarterly, 114(1), 31-51. Retrieved from 
http://xerxes.calstate.edu/sanbernardino/ 
Joffe, H. & Yardley, L. (2004) Content and thematic analysis. In D. F. Marks & L. 
Yardley (Eds.), Research methods for clinical and health psychology (pp. 
56-68). Retrieved form 
https://books.google.com/books?id=SHiUvmKzuFwC&printsec=frontcover 
Johns, R., & Shephard, M. (2007). Gender, candidate image and electoral 
preference. British Journal of Politics & International Relations, 9(3), 434-
460. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-856X.2006.00263.x 
Johnson, T., & Perlmutter, D. (2010). Introduction: The Facebook election. Mass 
Communication and Society, 13(5), 554-559. Retrieved from 
http://libproxy.lib.csusb.edu 
Johnson, T., Braima, M., & Sothirajah, J. (2000). Doing the traditional media 
sidestep: Comparing the effects of the internet and other nontraditional 
media with traditional media in the 1996 presidential campaign. 





Kakachia, K., Pataraia, T., & Cecire, M. (2014). Networked apathy: Georgian 




Kapoor, K., & Fabi, R. (2013, October 28). Indonesian politics grabs news 
headlines by banning monkey business. Reuters. Retrieved from 
http://www.reuters.com 
Kenski, K., Hardy, B., & Jamieson, K. (2010). The Obama victory: How media, 
money, and message shaped the 2008 election [e-Book version]. 
Retrieved from 
http://xerxes.calstate.edu/sanbernardino/books/record?id=b2692447h 
Keyton, J. (2006). Communication research: Asking questions, finding answers. 
New York: McGraw-Hill.  
Kimseng, M. (2014). Shaping political change: The role of social media in 
Cambodia’s 2013 elections. Asia Pacific Media Educator, 24(1), 107-116. 
doi: 10.1177/1326365X14539201  
Kinder, D. (1978). Political person perception: The asymmetrical influence of 
sentiment and choice on perceptions of presidential candidates. Journal of 





Kiousis, S., Bantimaroudis, P., & Ban, H. (1999). Candidate image attributes: 
Experiments in the substantive dimension of second level agenda setting. 
Communication Research, 26(4), 414-428. Retrieved from 
http://xerxes.calstate.edu/sanbernardino/articles/record?id=gale_ofa55389
572  
Kjeldahl, W. O., Carmichael, C. W., & Mertz, R. J. (1971). Factors in a 
presidential candidate’s image. Speech Monographs, 38, 129-131. 
Retrieved from http://xerxes.calstate.edu/sanbernardino/articles/record?id 
Komisi Pemilihan Umum. (2014). Data pemilih tetap pilpres [Data File]. Retrieved 
from https://data.kpu.go.id/ss8.php# 
Kuo, S-H. (2003). “You’re a little rabbit in a pack of foxes”: Animal metaphors in 
Chinese political discourse. Journal of Chinese Linguistics, 31(1), 72-100. 
Retrieved from http://xerxes.calstate.edu/sanbernardino/ 
Kushin, M., & Yamamoto, M. (2010). Did social media really matter? College 
students' use of online media and political decision making in the 2008 
election. Mass Communication and Society, 13(5), 608-630. doi: 
10.1080/15205436.2010.516863 
Larson, S. (1999). Public opinion in television election news: Beyond polls. 
Political Communication, 16(2), 133-145. doi: 101080105846099198695 
Lee, J., Choi, J., Kim, C., & Kim, Y. (2014). Social media, network heterogeneity, 




Lee, T. (2015). Defect or defend: Military responses to popular protests in 
authoritarian Asia. Retrieved from 
http://xerxes.calstate.edu/sanbernardino/books/record?id=b2681142 
Lestari, S. (2014, July 5). Pertarungan pilpres sengit di media social. Retrieved 
from http://www.bbc.com 
Levine, K. J. (2005). Voter decision making: The tensions of personal identity, 
personal ethics, and personal benefit. American Behavioral Scientist, 
49(1), 63. Retrieved from http://xerxes.calstate.edu/sanbernardino/ 
Lim, M. (2003). From war-net to net-war: The Internet and resistance identities in 
Indonesia. International Information and Library Review, 35(2), 233-248. 
doi:10.1016/S1057-2317(03)00019-5  
Lim, M. (2012). Clicks, cabs, and coffee houses: Social media and oppositional 
movements in Egypt, 2004–2011. Journal of Communication, 62(2), 231-
248. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2012.01628.x 
Lim, M. (2013). Many clicks but little sticks: Social media activism in Indonesia. 
Journal of Contemporary Asia, 43(4), 636-657. 
doi:10108000472336.2013769386 
Lindsay, J. (2009). Pomp, piety and performance: Pilkada in Yogyakarta 2005. In 
M. Erb & P. Sulistiyanto (Eds.), Deepening democracy in Indonesia? 
Direct elections for local leaders (pp. 211-229). Singapore, SG: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies.  
134 
 
Lippmann, W. (1922). Public Opinion. Retrieved from 
http://wwnorton.com/college/history/america-essential-
learning/docs/WLippmann-Public_Opinion-1922.pdf 
Liu, Y. (2011). Crafting a democratic enclave on the cyberspace: Case studies of 
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore. Journal of Current Southeast Asian 
Affairs, 30(4), 33-55. Retrieved from http://journals.sub.uni-
hamburg.de/giga/jsaa/article/viewFile/500/498  
Look back at the live blog: Indonesia’s presidential election. (2014, July 9). The 
Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from 
http://blogs.wsj.com/indonesiarealtime/2014/07/09/as-it-happens-
indonesias-presidential-election/ 
Maarif, A. S. (1996). Islam dan masalah kenegaraan: Studi dalam percaturan 
konstituante. Jakarta: LP3ES.  
Mattes, K., Spezio, M., Kim, H., Todorov, A., Adolphs, R., Alvarez, R. M. (2010). 
Predicting election outcomes from positive and negative trait assessments 
of candidate images. Political Psychology, 31(1), 41-58. doi: 
10.1111/j.1467-9221.2009.00745.x 
Metaxas, P., & Mustafaraj, E. (2012). Social media and the elections. Science, 
338(6106), 472-473. doi:10.1126/science.1230456  
Meyn, C. (2013, November 11). The rapid spread of social media is altering 
Cambodia’s political landscape, and the old guard is struggling to keep up. 
135 
 
South East Asia Globe. Retrieved from http://sea-globe.com/virtual-
democracy-social-media-elections-cambodia-cpp-cnrp/ 
Mietzner, M. (2006). The politics of military reform in post-Suharto Indonesia: 
Elite conflict, nationalism, and institutional resistance. Washington, DC: 
East-West Center Washington. Retrieved from 
http://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/handle/10125/3497/PS02
3.pdf?s 
Mietzner, M. (2014). How Jokowi won and democracy survived. Journal of 
Democracy, 25(4), pp. 111-125. doi:https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2014.0073 
Molaei, H. (2014). The prospect of civility in Indonesians’ online polarized political 
discussions. Asian Journal of Communication, 24(5), 490-504. doi: 
10.1080/01292986.2014.917116 
Molaei, H. (2015). Discursive opportunity structure and the contribution of social 
media to the success of social movements in Indonesia. Information, 
Communication & Society, 18(1), 94-108. doi: 
1010801369118X201493438 
Murphy, J., Link, M., Childs, J., Tesfaye, C., Dean, E., Stern, M., . . . Hardwood, 
P. (2014). Social media in public opinion research executive summary of 
the Aapor task force on emerging technologies in public opinion research. 
Public Opinion Quarterly, 78(4), 788-794. doi:10.1093/poq/nfu053 
136 
 
Murray, G. (2014). Evolutionary preferences for physical formidability in leaders. 
Politics & Life Sciences, 33(1), 33-52. Retrieved from 
https://www.cambridge.org/ 
Nam, Y., Lee, Y., & Park, H. (2015). Measuring web ecology by Facebook, 
Twitter, blogs and online news: 2012 general election in South Korea. 
Quality & Quantity, 49(2), 675-689. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.lib.csusb.edu/docview/1653052958?p
q-origsite=summon&accountid=10359  
Neuman, W. (1986). The paradox of mass politics: Knowledge and opinion in the 
American electorate. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard UP. 
Nimmo, D., & Savage, R. (1976). Candidates and their images: Concepts, 
methods, and findings. Pacific Palisades, California: Goodyear. 
Number of RI internet users increases to 71.19 million in 2013: APJII. (2014, 
January 15). The Jakarta Post. Retrieved from 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/01/15/number-ri-internet-users-
increases-7119-million-2013-apjii.html 
Nurhadryani, Y., Maslow, S., & Yamamoto, H. (2009). 'Democracy 1.0' meets 
'web 2.0': E-campaigning and the role of ICTS in Indonesia’s political 
reform process since 1998. Interdisciplinary Information Sciences, 15(2), 
211-222. doi: 10.4036/iis.2009.211 
O’Neil, M. (2014, July 2). Presidential candidates go viral in Indonesia’s social 
media elections. Retrieved from http://www.abc.net.au  
137 
 
Paath, C., & Maulia, E. (2015, January 2). Jokowi ups his game with chief of staff 
post. The Jakarta Post. Retrieved from http://joyonews.org/  
Papacharissi, Z. (2002). The virtual sphere: The internet as a public sphere. New 
Media & Society, 4(1), 9-27. doi:10.1177/14614440222226244 
Pennington, N., Winfrey, K. L., Warner, B. R., & Kearney, M. W. (2015). Liking 
Obama and Romney (on Facebook): An experimental evaluation of 
political engagement and efficacy during the 2012 general election. 
Computers in Human Behavior, 44, 279-283. Retrieved from 
http://libproxy.lib.csusb.edu 
Peters, J. D. (1995). Historical tensions in the concept of public opinion. In T. L. 
Glasser & C. T. Salmon (Eds.), Public opinion and the communication of 
consent (pp. 3–32). Retrieved from 
https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=oh1AHt9dc8gC&oi=fnd&pg
=PA3&dq=Peters+%281995%29+public+opinion 
Ponterotto, J. (2008). Brief note on the origins, evolution, and meaning of the 
qualitative research concept "thick description". Qualitative Report, 11(3), 
538-549. Retrieved from http://nsuworks.nova.edu/tqr/vol11/iss3/6 
Prabowo: What guarantees do people want from me? (2013, October 30). 
Tempo. Retrieved from https://en.tempo.com 
Prasetywan, W. (2012). Image construction in politics: Political advertisement in 
the 2009 Indonesian election. Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in 
138 
 
Southeast Asia, 27(2), 310-327. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2016.1258585 
Rachman, A., & Otto, B. (2015, April 11). Mega’s message to Jokowi: I’m the 
boss. Retrieved from http://blogs.wsj.com/.  
Rallis, S. F., & Rossman, G. B. (2003). Mixed methods in evaluation contexts: A 
pragmatic framework. In A. Tashakkori & C. Teddile (Eds.), Handbook of 
mixed methods and behavioral research (pp. 491-512). Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage. 




Saldaña, J. (2016). The coding manual for qualitative researchers. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage.  
Savulescu, R., & Vitelar, A. (2012). Pics or it didn't happen: Analyzing Facebook 
photographs of Romanian women politicians. Revista Română De 
Comunicare şi Relaţii Publice, 14(1), 7-20. Retrieved from 
http://libproxy.lib.csusb.edu 
Schonhardt, S. (2014, July 10). Twitter, Facebook made a splash in Indonesia’s 





Schwandt, T. A. (2001). Dictionary of qualitative inquiry (2nd ed.). Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Sears, D. O. (1983). The person-positivity bias. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 44, 233-250. Retrieved from 
http://xerxes.calstate.edu/sanbernardino/articles/record?id=apa_articles10
.1037%2F0022-3514.44.2.233 
Sejarawan kritisi kostum Nazi Dhani. (2014, June 25). Retrieved form 
http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/ 
Semiocast. (2012). Twitter reaches half a billion accounts more than 140 millions 
in the U.S [Data set]. Retrieved from 
http://semiocast.com/en/publications/2012_07_30_Twitter_reaches_half_a
_billion_accounts_140m_in_the_US 
Sheets, P., Domke, D., & Greenwald, A. (2011). God and country: The partisan 
psychology of the presidency, religion, and nation. Political Psychology, 
32(3), 459. Retrieved from http://xerxes.calstate.edu/sanbernardino/ 
Shershow, S. C. (1995). Puppets and “popular” culture. Retrieved from 
https://books.google.com 
Situmorang. F. (2012, March 20). Strategic, outermost islands too precious to 
lose. The Jakarta Post. Retrieved from http://www.thejakartapost.com 
Smuts, L. M. (2010). Social networking sites as a new public sphere: Facebook 
and its potential to facilitate public opinion as the function of public 
140 
 
discourse-a case study of the 2008 Obama campaign (Master’s thesis). 
Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/4209  
Social media during Indonesian presidential election. (2014). Retrieved from 
http://www.silkstream.net/blog/2014/07/social-media-indonesian-
presidential-election-2014.html 
Socialbakers. (2014). Facebook statistics by country [Data set]. Retrieved from 
http://www.socialbakers.com/facebook-statistics/  
Soon, C., & Kluver, R. (2014). Uniting political bloggers in diversity: Collective 
identity and web activism. Journal of Computer‐Mediated Communication, 
19(3), 500-515. doi: 10.1111/jcc4.12079 
Stanovich, K. E. (1986). How to think straight about psychology. Glenview, IL: 
Scott Foresman.  
Stieglitz, S., Brockmann, T., & Dang-Xuan, L. (2012, July). Usage of social media 
for political communication. Paper presented at Pacific Asia Conference 
on Information Systems, Ho chi minh City, Vietnam. 
Strömbäck, J. (2012). The media and their use of opinion polls: Reflecting and 
shaping public opinion. In C. Holtz-Bacha & J. Strömbäck (Eds.), Opinion 
polls and the media: Reflecting and shaping public opinion (pp. 1-22). 
Retrieved from https://books.google.com/  
Sunstein, C. (2001). Echo chambers: Bush v. Gore, impeachment, and beyond. 




Suryadinata, L. (2002). Election and politics in Indonesia. Singapore: ISEAS.  
Tannen, D. (1989) Talking voices: Repetition, dialogue, and imagery in 
conversational discourse. New York: Cambridge UP.  
Taylor, C. (1990). Modes of Civil Society. Public Culture, 3(1), 95-118.  
Thalang, C. (2005). The presidential elections in Indonesia, July and September 
2004. Electoral Studies, 24(4), 755-761. 
doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2005.03.006 
The report Indonesia: 2014. (2014). Retrieved from https://books.google.com 
Thompson, W. (2001). Policy making through thick and thin: Thick description as 
a methodology for communications and democracy. Policy Sciences, 
34(1), 63-77. Retrieved from http://xerxes.calstate.edu/sanbernardino 
Todorov, A., Mandisodza, A., Goren, A., & Hall, C. (2005). Inferences of 
competence from faces predict election outcomes. Science, 308, 1623-
1626.  doi:10.1126/science.1110589  
Top sites in Indonesia. (2015, October 8). Retrieved from 
http://www.alexa.com/topsites/countries/ID 
Tornquist, O. (2014). Assessing dynamics of democratization: Transformative 
politics, new institution, and the case of Indonesia. New York: Palgrave 





Trent, J., Short-Thompson, C., Mongeau, P., Nusz, A., & Trent, J. (2001). Image, 
media bias, and voter characteristics: The ideal candidate from 1988-
2000. The American Behavioral Scientist, 44(12), 2101-2124. Retrieved 
from http://xerxes.calstate.edu/sanbernardino/ 
Tyson, A., & Purnomo, B. (2017). President Jokowi and the 2014 obor rakyat 
controversy in Indonesia. Critical Asian Studies, 49(1), 117-136.  
Ufen, A. (2010). Electoral campaigning in Indonesia: The professionalization and 
commercialization after 1998. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 
29(4), 11-37. Retrieved from http://journals.sub.uni-
hamburg.de/giga/jsaa/article/ 
Van Summeren, C. (2007). Religion online: The shaping of multidimensional 




Vitak, J., Zube, P., Smock, A., Carr, C. T., Ellison, N., & Lampe, C. (2011). It's 
complicated: Facebook users' political participation in the 2008 election. 
Cyberpsychology Behavior and Social Networking, 14(3), 17-114.  
Vogler, C. (2000). Social identity and emotion: The meeting of psychoanalysis 




Warner, B. R., Carlin, D. B., Winfrey, K., Schnoebelen, J., & Trosanovski, M. 
(2011). Will the “real” candidates for president and vice president please 
stand up? 2008 pre- and post- debate viewer perceptions of candidate 
image. American Behavioral Scientist, 55, 232-252. 
Weeks, B. E., & Garrett, R.K. (2014). Electoral consequences of political rumors: 
Motivated reasoning, candidate rumors, and vote choice during the 2008 
U.S. presidential election. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 
26, 401-422. Retrieved from http://xerxes.calstate.edu/sanbernardino 
Wen, W. (2014). Facebook political communication in Taiwan: 1.0/2.0 messages 
and election/post-election messages. Chinese Journal of Communication, 
7(1), 19-39. Retrieved from http://libproxy.lib.csusb.edu 
Wheeler, M. (2013). Celebrity Politics. Malden, MA: Polity.  
Widhiarto, H., & Kusumari, A. (2014. June 30). Furniture business propels 
Jokowi’s path to prominence. The Jakarta Post. Retrieved from 
www.thejakartapost.com 
Woolley, J., Limperos, A., & Oliver, M. (2010). The 2008 presidential election, 
2.0: A content analysis of user-generated political Facebook groups. Mass 
Communication and Society, 13(5), 631-652. Retrieved from 
http://libproxy.lib.csusb.edu 
Xiong, F., & Liu, Y. (2014). Opinion formation on social media: An empirical 




Yangyue, L. (2011). Crafting a democratic enclave on the cyberspace: Case 
studies of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore. Journal of Current 
Southeast Asian Affairs, 30(4), 33. Retrieved from http://journals.sub.uni-
hamburg.de/giga/jsaa/article/view/500 
Zakahi, W.R. (2004). Presidential debates and candidate image formation: 1992, 
1996, 2000. In K. L. Hacker (Ed.), Presidential candidate images (pp. 151-
175). Retrieved from 
https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=PFDGYnGTNMoC&oi 
Zulkarnain, I. (2014). "Playable" nationalism: Nusantara online and the "gamic" 
reconstructions of national history. SOJOURN: Journal of Social Issues in 
Southeast Asia, 29(1), 1-31. doi: 10.1355/sj29-1b 
 
